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Introduction
Jenny Flores was a teenager when she was detained by the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). Flores and other unac-
companied minors awaiting deportation proceedings were "held in
detention by the INS for as long as two years in highly inappropriate
conditions."' There were few opportunities for recreation and no ed-
ucational programs.2 The children were subjected to routine strip
searches.3 Some were forced to share sleeping quarters and bath-
rooms with unrelated adults of both sexes.4
The INS confined Godwin Imasuen for several months in local
jails and municipal lock-ups not suited for long-term detention.
Imasuen was transferred among as many as five such facilities each
1. Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 1014 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher, J., dissenting), va-
cated, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (en bane), rev'd sub nom., Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct.
1439 (1993).
2. Id.
3. The strip search policy was declared unconstitutional in Flores v. Meese, 681 F.
Supp. 665 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
4. Flores, 934 F.2d at 1014 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); see also AMERICAS WATCH, BRu-
TALITY UNCHECKED: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ALONG THE U.S. BORDER WITH MEXICO
67-75 (1992) [hereinafter BRUTALITY UNCHECKED]; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
DETENTION OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS 56-60 (1990) [hereinafter ACLU DETENTION RE-
PORT] (describing the prevailing detention conditions for juvenile alien detainees). In
1987, the INS entered into a consent decree obligating it to transfer all juveniles detained
more than 72 hours following arrest to "shelter care" facilities that meet certain minimum
standards. Memorandum of Understanding re: Compromise of Class Action: Conditions
of Detention, Flores (No. 85-4544-RJK) (on file with author). In later litigation, the
Supreme Court refused to entertain arguments that the detention conditions for juveniles
were not in compliance with this decree. Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1446-47. But see Brief for
Southwest Refugee Project, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, and the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Flores
(No. 91-905) (citing evidence of noncompliance).
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week; his family and attorney were not kept informed of his wherea-
bouts. One local holding cell was called un vaso de agua by INS de-
tainees because a glass of water was all they were served for dinner.5
Manuel Vald~s, a former Cuban diplomat seeking asylum in the
United States, was confined by the INS at a detention facility run by
Esmor Correctional Services Corporation in Elizabeth, New Jersey.6
Reports of unfit detention conditions and mistreatment of detainees
at Esmor were largely ignored until a riot erupted in June 1995.1 An
INS investigation, concluded after the riot, painted a shocking picture
of private detention run amok at the Esmor facility, where untrained
guards routinely abused detainees without oversight or intervention
from INS officials. 8
Flores, Imasuen, and Vald6s are among the thousands of persons
detained by the INS each year. The detention of aliens9 has sparked
litigation and controversy for over a decade. Our shifting policies to-
5. These allegations appear in the complaint filed in a class-action lawsuit challenging
detention conditions for aliens held in the Chicago area. Imasuen v. Moyer, No. 91-C-
5425, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1449 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 1991); see also Lizette Alvarez & Lisa
Getter, Detention: The Failed Deterrent, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 16, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter
Alvarez & Gutter, Detention: The Failed Deterrent] (noting in Chicago the "INS kept de-
tainees in barren holding cells, where they got no exercise and, at times, no food"). See
infra notes 177-180 and accompanying text for additional discussion of the Imasuen
litigation.
6. Robert Hanley, Refugees Fled Woes of the World to Find Themselves Locked up in
Elizabeth, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 1995, at A15; see also John Sullivan & Matthew Purdy, In
Corrections Business, Shrewdness Pays, N.Y. Tnms, July 23, 1995, at Al; John Sullivan,
Violence at Immigration Jail Exposes Troubled Company, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1995, at Al
(describing history of Esmor Correctional Services Corporation and the Elizabeth, N.J.
immigration detention facility).
7. See Maureen Castellano, INS to Probe Conditions at Private Jail for Aliens, N.J.
L.J., June 12, 1995, at 5 (reporting claims of inhumane treatment prompted the INS to
investigate the conditions at Esmor; the investigation commenced one week before the
riot); Elizabeth Llorente, Shackled in the Land of Hope: Asylum Seekers Held for Months,
BERGEN REc., Mar. 12, 1995, at Al (noting complaints about abuse, inedible food, and
shackling of detainees).
8. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERIM
REPORT: THm ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY CONTRAcr DETENTION FACILITY OPERATED BY
ESMOR INc. (1995) [hereinafter INS ESMOR REPORT] (on file with author). The condi-
tions at the Esmor facility, and the results of the INS investigation, are summarized infra
notes 155-165 and accompanying text.
9. I use the term "alien" with some reluctance because of the pejorative connotations
that this word sometimes carries. See Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive
Branch's Asylum Decisions, UTAH L. REv. 279, 281 n.5 (1991); Gerald M. Rosberg, The
Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup.
Or. REv. 275,303. Nevertheless, this is the term used in immigration law to describe "any
person not a citizen or national of the United States." Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 [hereinafter INA], Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(3), 66 Stat. 163, 166, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3) (1994).
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ward Haitians and Cubans seeking refuge in the United States have
been at the center of this debate.'" Most of the lawsuits filed on be-
half of INS detainees have sought to secure their release or parole
into the United States. Behind this first-order desire for release, how-
ever, lurks another important concern: the conditions of confinement
at the detention facilities and jails where the INS detains aliens.
Alien detainees are not protected by the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, as this provision
applies only to prisoners incarcerated for criminal convictions." In-
stead, aliens confined by the INS, like pretrial detainees awaiting
criminal trials, must challenge the conditions of their confinement
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 12 Due pro-
cess protection against inhumane conditions ought to be "at least as
great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted
prisoner."' For aliens seeking to enter the United States, however,
any due process claim is fraught with uncertainty under the century-
old "plenary power" doctrine that purports to place them "largely
outside the mantle of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."' 4
10. In the early 1980s, over 125,000 Cubans and several thousand Haitians seeking
entry into the United States traveled in makeshift boats to Florida. Thousands were de-
tained by the INS. See infra notes 70-71, 270 and accompanying text. The United States
Coast Guard then began interdicting Haitians before they reached the United States shore.
Haitian interdictees were, at various times, either returned to their country or held at "safe
haven" camps at Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba. See generally Harold Hongju Koh,
Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1 (1994)
(describing litigation challenging the United States rapidly changing policy towards Hai-
tians fleeing by boat). Cubans, on the other hand, were generally admitted to the United
States until the summer of 1994, when they too were detained at Guantanamo. See A
Slow-Motion Mariek Cubans (and Haitians) Take to Sea, 71 INTERPRFTER RELEASES 1091,
1091-92 (1994) (summarizing events leading to the recreation of detention camps on Guan-
tanamo for Haitian and Cuban refugees).
11. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977); Paul W. Schmidt, Detention
of Aliens, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 305, 321 (1987).
12. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court concluded that pretrial detainees must pur-
sue conditions claims under the Due Process Clause. 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). The
Supreme Court has never considered the conditions claims of alien detainees, but lower
courts have assumed that these claims are governed by the Due Process Clause. See
Schmidt, supra note 11, at 321.
13. City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
14. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1450 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Ferrer-
Mazorra v. Meese, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
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To someone uninitiated to the "constitutional oddity""5 of immi-
gration law, it may seem astonishing to suggest that aliens confined by
the INS have no due process rights. Yet this suggestion has been
raised time and again in leading immigration cases. The Supreme
Court has staked out a role of extreme deference to the political
branches' "plenary power" over immigration. This "hands off" ap-
proach dictated by the plenary power doctrine "smothers the entire
field of immigration law so completely" 6 that it is unusual to findimmigration cases that seriously consider constitutional claims as-
serted by aliens. Among the Court's most notorious plenary power
decisions are those asserting that the Due Process Clause does not
protect aliens seeking entry, even when they are detained within the
United States.17
From its inception, however, the plenary power doctrine has ex-
isted alongside cases that provide constitutional protection to aliens
when their claims do not relate to immigration matters. Outside ofimmigration law, "[a]liens, even aliens whose presence in this country
is unlawful, have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due
process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."'18 Thus,
aliens enjoy a full panoply of constitutional rights in criminal proceed-
ings19 and generally are protected from invidious discrimination by
state and local authorities.2 °
This "aliens' rights" tradition contrasts sharply with the plenary
power doctrine. The competing traditions are typically explained as
operating in two completely separate realms. The plenary power doc-
trine controls "immigration law," usually defined as "the body of law
governing the admission and expulsion of aliens."12 ' The aliens' rights
15. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congres-
sional Power, 1984 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 255, 255 [hereinafter Legomsky, Immigration Law and
Plenary Power].
16. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545, 574 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Motomura, Phantom Norms].
17. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210, 212 (1953); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); see infra notes 212-228.
18. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
19. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,238 (1896); United States v. Henry, 604
F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1979). But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990) (discussed infra notes 245-252 and accompanying text).
20. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 369 (1886). But see infra note 235 (discussing the "political function" exemption to
this principle).
21. Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 16, at 547 (citing Legomsky, Immigration
Law and Plenary Power, supra note 15, at 256).
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tradition is said to operate outside of the realm of immigration law,
when aliens bring claims that do not impinge on the "plenary" immi-
22gration power. There are some notable cases withholding constitu-
tional protection from aliens even when their claims fall outside of the
immigration context.23 Nevertheless, the aliens' rights tradition gen-
erally marks a domain where courts "t[ake] th[e] constitutional claims
[of aliens] seriously, in contrast to the cavalier treatment of constitu-
tional claims in immigration law."24
Only a handful of reported cases have decided the due process
challenges to conditions of confinement suffered by alien detainees.25
These cases reflect confusion over which of the two competing lines of
cases-the plenary power doctrine or the aliens' rights tradition-
should govern conditions claims. In Lynch v. Cannatella, for example,
the Fifth Circuit correctly held that all alien detainees, regardless of
22. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 862,865 (1989) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation] ("Outside the immi-
gration process, aliens receive most of the constitutional protections afforded citizens.");
see also Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 16, at 565; Legomsky, Immigration Law
and Plenary Power, supra note 15, at 256. For a critique of this "inside/outside" immigra-
tion law dichotomy, see Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference that
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047, 1059-65 (1994).
23. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75 (holding Fourth Amendment does not
apply to a search by American officials of the Mexican residence of a Mexican citizen
detained within the United States); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83-84 (1976) (upholding
federal law denying Medicare benefits to certain noncitizens); Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603, 621 (1960) (upholding provision of the Social Security Act cutting off benefits to
aliens deported for past membership in the Communist party). These cases are discussed
infra notes 245-263 and accompanying text.
24. Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 16, at 566.
25. See Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990); Medina v. O'Neill, 838
F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'g 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810
F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987); Ortega v. Rowe, 796 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1013 (1987); Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (vacated
per settlement agreement). In several other cases, courts have alluded to conditions
problems at alien detention facilities, or have addressed conditions claims only tangentially
in the midst of litigation challenging other aspects of INS detention. See, e.g., Orantes-
Hemandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 363-64 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (conditions of confinement
discussed in conjunction with litigation seeking to end coerced departure of Salvadoran
detainees); Vigile v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.) and Bertrand v. Sava, 535 F.
Supp. 1020, 1030-31 (S.D.N.Y.) (companion cases) (noting Haitian detainees were incar-
cerated in "substandard" and "inadequate" facilities that constituted a "harsh environ-
ment"), rev'd, 684 F.2d 204,207 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982) (characterizing district court's comments
about conditions of confinement as "unsubstantiated conclusory statements made in pass-
ing"). In addition, several suits brought by hlien detainees challenging conditions of con-
finement have settled without reported opinion. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439,
1446-47 (1993) (refusing to consider arguments that conditions were oppressive for juve-
nile alien detainees because similar claims had previously been settled by consent decree);
Stipulation of Agreement, Lam v. Smith, No. CV-79-0795 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 24, 1981).
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their status under immigration law, can claim due process protection
to challenge mistreatment at the hands of their captors.2 6 The Lynch
court rejected the defendants' plenary power argument that aliens on
the threshold of entry "possess no constitutional rights," and instead
relied upon cases from the aliens' rights tradition.2 7
Later cases, however, have suggested alien detainees who have
not been formally admitted into the country have only a limited con-
stitutional right to be free from "malicious infliction of cruel treat-
ment" or "gross physical abuse."2 Ironically, this standard is derived
from language in Lynch,29 but it is inconsistent with Lynch's promise
of full constitutional protection for aliens challenging conditions of
confinement. No other government detainees-not even incarcerated
criminals-must show "malicious infliction of cruel treatment" or
"gross physical abuse" to state a constitutional violation.30 This
higher constitutional hurdle sometimes imposed on alien detainees re-
flects the silent influence of the plenary power doctrine on cases that
should be governed by the aliens' rights tradition.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of immigration deten-
tion. Part II documents serious conditions problems at the detention
facilities and state and local jails where aliens are incarcerated. Part
II[ explains how recent litigation over the due process rights of Hai-
tian and Cuban detainees helped to define a boundary for the plenary
power doctrine, which was used by the Lynch court to uphold aliens'
due process right to challenge the conditions of their confinement.
Part IV shows how Lynch has been undermined by later cases that
implicitly deny full due process protection to some alien detainees
seeking to challenge the conditions of their confinement, much as the
plenary power doctrine defeats the constitutional claims of aliens
within the immigration law realm. In Part V, I conclude that courts
must guard against the infiltration of the plenary power doctrine into
the aliens' rights tradition, even though such vigilance might some-
26. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1374.
27. Id. at 1372-73. Accord Haitian Ctrs. Council, 823 F. Supp at 1042.
28. Medina v. O'Neill, 838 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir. 1988); Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d
1552, 1559-60 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d
1437, 1442, amended on other grounds, 997 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1993); Correa v. Thorn-
burgh, 901 F2d 1166, 1171 n.5 (2d Cir. 1990); Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1550 (ND.
Cal. 1993) (dicta reiterating the "malicious infliction of cruel treatment" or "gross physical
abuse" standard).
29. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1374.
30. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305-06 (1991); Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct.
995, 999-1001 (1992) (rejecting similar standards as too stringent for Eighth Amendment
claims); infra notes 330-340 and accompanying text.
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times reinforce the isolation of immigration law from constitutional
values.
The analysis in this Article is animated by two overarching goals.
First, I want to focus attention on the conditions of confinement im-
posed upon alien detainees. The INS has an appalling history of de-
taining aliens in substandard and sometimes inhumane conditions.
Despite recent efforts to improve conditions at some facilities, the INS
continues to use detention to deter large influxes of potential refu-
gees, a practice that has repeatedly created serious conditions
problems. Moreover, as the recent investigation of the Esmor facility
has shown, the INS also confines aliens in state and local jails and
private facilities without adequate oversight. It is not surprising, then,
that the agency remains embroiled in litigation over conditions of
confinement. 31
Second, I use conditions cases as a lens to examine the relation-
ship between the plenary power doctrine and the aliens' rights tradi-
tion. Many leading commentators have argued that the plenary power
doctrine should be discarded;32 some have suggested that the doctrine
is already in a state of decline.33 But they typically have examined the
impact of the plenary power doctrine only within the realm of immi-
gration law, when aliens press claims to enter or remain in the United
States.34 From this narrow perspective, the aliens' rights tradition, to
31. Two class action lawsuits now pending in California challenge the conditions of
confinement suffered by alien detainees. Central Am. Refugee Ctr. v. Reno, No. CV 93-
4162-MRP (C.D. Cal. June 23, 1995) (order certifying class of aliens detained in the INS
Los Angeles district); Kattola v. Reno, No. CV 94-4859-KN (C.D. Cal. filed May 3, 1995)
(nationwide class of aliens confined by the INS in facilities across the country).
32. See, e.g., Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L.
Rnv. 965, 972 [hereinafter, Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door]; Hiroshi
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Sub-
stantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1627-28 (1992) [hereinafter
Motomura, Procedural Surrogates]; Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sov-
ereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HA.~v. L. REv. 853, 863
(1987).
33. For a reassessment of the current state of the plenary power doctrine, see Stephen
T. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995) [hereinafter Legomsky, Ten More Years]; see also
Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 16, at 549; Legomsky, Immigration Law and Ple-
nary Power, supra note 15, at 306-07; Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration
Law, 84 COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 90 (1984) [hereinafter Schuck, Transformation of Immigration
Law].
34. See, e.g., Legomsky, Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 15, at 256
(stating that immigration law "is the sphere in which the plenary power doctrine has oper-
ated"). But see Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, supra note 32, at 994-97
(arguing the plenary power doctrine has expanded beyond immigration claims to govern-
ment benefits and search and seizure decisions); Bosniak, supra note 22, at 1065 (sug-
Summer 19951 CHALLENGING CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
the extent that it is considered at all, is seen as a destabilizing force, a
source of constitutional protection for aliens that may contribute to
the eventual demise of the plenary power doctrine.3 5 This analysis
suggests that the boundary separating the plenary power doctrine
from the aliens' rights tradition is slowly eroding, but only to allow the
one-way migration of constitutional values into immigration law.
I contend, however, that the border between the plenary power
doctrine and the aliens' rights tradition is in fact porous in both direc-
tions. And unfortunately the spillover across this porous border does
not necessarily weaken the plenary power doctrine. Cases adjudicat-
ing alien detainees' challenges to conditions of confinement demon-
strate how the plenary power doctrine infects decisions outside the
realm of immigration law, and works to undermine the aliens' rights
tradition.
I. Overview of Immigration Detention
A. Statutory Framework
The INS enjoys broad authority to detain aliens seeking entry
into or awaiting expulsion from the United States. The statutory
framework for detention, as does all of immigration law, distinguishes
between "excludable" and "deportable" aliens. "Excludable aliens"
are those seeking to enter the United States.3 6 First-time applicants
for admission and resident aliens seeking to re-enter the country after
a trip abroad fall into this category.37
gesting the traditional analysis "tends to seriously overstate the status of aliens on the so-
called 'outside"').
35. Hiroshi Motomura, for example, has argued that the aliens' rights tradition has
influenced the development of immigration law by "provid[ing] the normative foundation
for results at odds with strict application of the plenary power doctrine." Motomura,
Phantom Norms, supra note 16, at 566-67. Alex Aleinikoff has made a similar argument,
asserting that "cases recognizing constitutional protection for aliens outside the immigra-
tion context provide critical purchase for reorienting" immigration law. T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 9,
19 (1990) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Membership and the Constitution).
36. See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 23 (4th ed.
1994); DAVID A. MARTIN, FEDERAL JUDICIARY CM., MAJOR ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION
LAW 9-11 (1987).
37. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines an "entry" as "any coming of an
alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession."
INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994) (emphasis added). Under this definition,
aliens lawfully residing within the United States who are returning from a trip abroad are
subject to exclusion proceedings. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 27-32 (1982). Law-
ful permanent residents, however, returning from a trip that was "innocent, casual, and
brief' and not meant to be "meaningfully interruptive" of their status are deemed not to
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The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") provides that
"every alien" seeking entry "who may not appear to the examining
immigration officer at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to land shall be detained for further inquiry. '38 This
provision appears to make detention mandatory for all aliens subject
to exclusion proceedings. But a different section of the INA modifies
this language by granting the Attorney General discretion to "parole"
rather than detain any alien applying for admission "for emergent rea-
sons or reasons deemed strictly in the public interest. ' 39 Parole allows
aliens the freedom to live inside the United States while they await a
final determination of their application to enter.4 0
Neither parole nor detention within the United States counts as
an "entry" under immigration law.4" Instead, under a legal fiction
sometimes known as the "entry doctrine," excludable aliens are
"treated as if stopped at the border," even when they are paroled or
confined within the United States.42
The INA also provides for the detention of "deportable aliens"
who, unlike excludable aliens, have already entered the United
States.43 Aliens lawfully admitted into the country can be deported
for the reasons delineated in INA section 241(a).44 Aliens who evade
inspection or surreptitiously cross the border are also subject to de-
portation proceedings.45 Deportable aliens may be confined pending
an administrative hearing to determine their right to remain in the
have made a new "entry," and thus can escape application of the exclusion grounds. Ro-
senberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1963); see KuRZBAN, supra note 36, at 25-27.
38. INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1994) (emphasis added). The "further inquiry"
refers to exclusion proceedings before a "special inquiry officer," now known as an immi-
gration judge, to determine whether an alien will be admitted to the United States. Id; 8
C.F.R. § 235.6 (1994). Excludable aliens can be refused permission to enter for the reasons
listed in INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1994).
39. INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1994). The regulations governing
the exercise of this parole power, codified at 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1994), are discussed infra
notes 74-75.
40. See 2 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.01[1]
(Rev. ed. 1995).
41. See INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1994) (parole "shall not be
regarded as admission"); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1958) (neither deten-
tion for over a year in the United States nor release on parole constitutes an "entry").
42. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953).
43. See KURZBAN, supra note 36, at 23.
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
45. See generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINiKoF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND
POLICY 474-86 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter ALEiNIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND
POLICY]; In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960, 962-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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country, 6 or after a final deportation order has been issued while ar-
rangements are being made for their departure.4 7
Excludable aliens generally have fewer statutory and constitu-
tional rights than deportable aliens.48 This pattern holds true for
aliens in detention. Deportable aliens usually are not detained unless
they await expulsion for criminal conduct 9 Aliens who are confined
by the INS pending a deportation hearing are entitled to petition animmigration judge for a redetermination of their custody status.50
Those who are subject to a final order of deportation can be held no
longer than six months.51 Additionally, aliens in deportation proceed-
ings are entitled to claim procedural due process protection.52 This
has enabled detained deportable aliens to challenge INS practices that
may impinge upon their constitutional right to fair proceedings. 3
Excludable alien detainees do not enjoy the same protections.
Detained excludable aliens, unlike deportable aliens, are not entitled
46. INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994).
47. INA § 242(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1994).
48. See AL~rnnors ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY, supra note 45, at
475-76 (delineating differences between deportation and exclusion proceedings).
49. See 3 GORDON r AL., supra note 40, § 72.03[4][c][iii] (during the pendency of
deportation proceedings, aliens are detained only when found to be a threat to national
security or a poor bail risk); id. § 72.08[1][b][ii] (power to order detention after final order
of deportation is rarely used). The detention of aliens convicted of crimes, in order to
expedite their deportation, is now a top priority for the INS. See infra notes 82-94 and
accompanying text.
50. INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994); 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.19, 242.2(d) (1994);
see 3 GORDON Er AL., supra note 40, § 72.03 [4][c][iii]; Janet A. Gilboy, Setting Bail in
Deportation Cases: The Role of Immigration Judges, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 347 (1987).
51. INA § 242(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1994); KURZBAN, supra note 36, at 136-37.
Courts have allowed the INS to detain aliens subject to a final order of deportation for
longer than six months when the alien is deemed responsible for the delay. See Balogun v.
INS, 9 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 1993) (delay allegedly caused because alien hampered INS
attempts to obtain necessary travel documents); Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204,
211-12 (2d Cir. 1991) (delay caused by detainee-initiated litigation).
52. Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
See Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 32, at 1628 (arguing this procedural due
process "exception" to the plenary power doctrine often serves as a surrogate for substan-
tive judicial review).
53. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 385-87 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (pre-
liminary injunction issued on behalf of Salvadorans detained pending deportation proceed-
ings, providing inter alia that the INS must inform class members of their right to apply for
asylum and end various practices that limited detainees' access to their attorneys);
Orantes-Hemandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1511-14 (C.D. Cal. 1988), affd sub nom.,
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) (permanent injunction to
same effect); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578,587 (S.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 692
F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982) (similar injunction); see also Note, INS Transfer Policy: Interfer-
ence with Detained Aliens' Due Process Right to Retain Counsel, 100 HARV. L. Rlv. 2001
(1987) [hereinafter INS Transfer Policy].
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to petition an immigration judge for release.54 Instead, the decision to
parole excludable aliens is delegated exclusively to INS officials,55 and
courts are very reluctant to overturn a denial of parole.56 Moreover,
the INA does not impose any time limit on the detention of excluda-
ble aliens; several courts have held that they can be detained indefi-
nitely.57 Indeed, as will be discussed below, excludable aliens are
sometimes said to have "virtually no constitutional rights," even when
they are detained within the United States.58
Excludable and deportable alien detainees are alike, however, in
one important respect: they are not being incarcerated as punishment
for a crime. Instead, they are held in civil confinement pending the
outcome of administrative proceedings. 59 Alien detainees generally
can secure their own release if they are willing to waive their right to a
hearing and to abandon any claim to enter into or remain in the coun-
try. Deportable aliens can, in most circumstances, cut short their de-
tention stay through a procedure known as "voluntary departure. '60
Excludable aliens are sometimes permitted to withdraw their applica-
54. See 2 GORDON ET AL.., supra note 40, § 63.05[3], at 63-36.
55. The Attorney General's authority to grant parole is delegated to the INS district
director in charge of the port of entry. See id § 64.01[3]; 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1994).
56. See Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 9-11 (1st Cir. 1987) (district director's deci-
sion to deny parole must be upheld whenever supported by a "facially legitimate and bona
fide reason"); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1022 (1986) (applying same standard); Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204,211-13 (2d Cir.
1982) (exercise of broad discretionary power to deny parole must be viewed as "presump-
tively legitimate and bona fide in the absence of strong proof to the contrary").
57. E.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1995); Gisbert v.
United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1441-43, amended, 997 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.
1993); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 (11th Cir. 1984). Contra Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1981).
58. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1449 (11th Cir. 1986); see infra notes 212-228
(discussing Knauff and Mezei decisions).
59. Schmidt, supra note 11, at 305 (noting "the INS stands alone in its authority to
incarcerate individuals who neither have been charged with, nor have been convicted of,
crimes").
60. INA §§ 242(b), 244(e), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b), 1254(e) (1994); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.5 (1994); A.nLmxor ET AL, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND PoLIcY, supra note 45, at
640-43. To be eligible for voluntary departure after the commencement of deportation
proceedings, aliens must be persons of "good moral character" as defined in INA § 101(f),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(4) (1994); see KuRZBAN, supra note 36, at 552-53.
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tions to enter.61 Aliens who elect these options are released from cus-
tody on the condition they leave the United States.62
B. The Expanded INS Detention Mission
Voluntary departure helps to allocate scarce detention re-
sources. 63 Historically, voluntary departure operated to limit most im-
migration detention to short-term confinement. Most alien detainees
were residents of Mexico who waived their right to a hearing and were
held only a few days until transportation to the border could be
arranged. 64
Over the past two decades, however, immigration detention has
been radically transformed. The average length of confinement for
alien detainees has increased dramaticaUy. 65 For many aliens, immi-
gration detention is no longer a brief stop on the way to the border.
Instead, alien detainees from all over the world 66 are now held for
months, or even years, waiting for a determination of their immigra-
61. The INA does not explicitly provide an equivalent to voluntary departure for ex-
cludable aliens. But excludable aliens may be allowed to withdraw their application to
enter if they agree to depart from the United States. Once exclusion proceedings have
commenced, an immigration judge will not grant permission to withdraw unless the INS
consents. See KuRzBAN, supra note 36, at 67-68, 72.
62. The term "voluntary departure" is sometimes a misnomer. The desire to escape
detention can be a powerful incentive to waive even valid claims; some detainees have
been coerced to accept this option. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488,
1494-97, 1505-06 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd sub nor., Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919
F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) (enjoining a widespread practice of coercing detainees from El
Salvador to accept voluntary depaiture). In addition, many aliens who elect this option do
not depart, and those who leave may quickly return across the border. See AtLmrNiou ET
AL, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICy, supra note 45, at 640-43; Lizette Alvarez & Lisa
Getter, Inability to deport has fueled the influx, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 14, 1993, at 1A.
63. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PRocEss AN POLICY, supra note 45, at 640.
64. In 1975, for example, 92% of alien detainees were residents of Mexico. Eighty-
four percent of detained aliens elected voluntary departure. INS detainees spent an aver-
age of 3.2 days in confinement. IMMIGRATION AND NATuRALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUsTICE, FEDERAL DETENTION PLAN 1993-1997 15 (1992) [hereinafter FIVE-YEAR DE-
TENTION PLAN].
65. Aliens confined at major INS detention facilities were being detained an average
of 54 days in 1991. U.S. GEN. AccouNTrNG OFncE, PUB. No. GAO/GGD-92-85, IMMI-
ORATION CONTROL- IMMIGRATION PoLIcIEs AFFECr INS DETENTION EFFORTS 26 (1992)
[hereinafter GAO DETENTION REPORT] (field study of immigration detention). The INS
reported alien detainees from countries other than Mexico ("OTMs" in INS parlance) av-
eraged 41 days in detention in fiscal year 1991. FrvE-YEAR DETENTION PLAN, supra note
64, at 16.
66. The GAO field study found 73% of aliens confined in INS detention facilities were
from countries other than Mexico. Alien detainees came from 92 different countries.
GAO DETENTION REPORT, supra, note 65, at 24. INS statistics for the fiscal year 1991
concluded that OTMs comprised 48% of the total immigration detention population, as
compared to less than 8% in 1975. FIVE-YEAR DErENTION PLAN, supra note 64, at 16.
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tion status.67 This transformation has been fueled by unprecedented
world events and a significant expansion of the INS detention mission.
The first major shift in immigration detention policy was a con-
troversial decision to detain virtually all excludable aliens who arrive
without valid entry documents.68 From 1954 until 1981, the vast ma-
jority of excludable aliens were paroled pending a final determination
of their immigration status.69 This policy was abandoned, however, in
response to an unprecedented influx of Cubans and Haitians seeking
refuge in the United States. The sudden arrival of over 125,000
Cubans in the Mariel boatlift of 1980,70 coupled with a smaller contin-
gent of Haitians fleeing the Duvalier regime,71 put enormous strain on
a fledgling system created to allow persons fleeing persecution in their
home countries to apply for asylum within the United States. 72 Re-
67. See ACLU DETENnON REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-7 (at the end of 1984, 1053
aliens had been held in INS detention for over 30 days; 407 had been confined for three
months or more); GAO DETE NMON REPORT, supra note 65, at 29 (170 excludable aliens
had been in detention over 90 days, some for almost two years); Alisa Solomon, The Prison
on Varick Street, N.Y. TimEs, June 11, 1994, at A21 (Ethiopian Jew who claimed well-
founded fear of persecution in his home country had been detained by the INS for over
four years).
68. I use the term "entry documents" to refer to the visas aliens receive while still
abroad and present upon initial inspection to enter the United States. Technically, how-
ever, a visa does not convey the right to enter the country. See INA § 221(h), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1201(h) (1994). Aliens with valid visas may still be excluded if they fall within the
grounds listed in INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1994).
69. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F.
Supp. 973,980 n.18 (S.D. Fla. 1982), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Jean v. Nelson,
711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir.), vacated, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en bane), affd as modi-
fied, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); see also 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, § 8.09[1], at 8-18.
70. See Mariel Cuban Parole Determinations, 52 Fed. Reg. 48, 799-802 (1987); Louis,
544 F. Supp. at 978-81.
71. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY, supra note 45, at
446-47; GAO DETENTION REPORT, supra note 65, at 36 (noting while few Haitians at-
tempted to enter the United States in the 1970s, 15,093 Haitian migrants arrived in 1980).
72. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, formally codified the
United States' historical practice of resettling refugees, with some significant changes.
First, INA § 243(h), which had granted the Attorney General discretion to withhold depor-
tation for persons who would face physical persecution upon return to their home country,
was transformed into a mandatory obligation, consistent with the international law princi-
ple of nonrefoulement. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994). Second, the 1980 Act for the first time
created a discretionary "asylum" status for persons already in the United States who could
show they were unable or unwilling to return to their home country due to "persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion." INA §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 208(a), 8 U.S.C.
88 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a) (1994). Within weeks after the Refugee Act was signed by
President Carter, the Mariel boatlift had begun. Schuck, Transformation of Immigration
Law, supra note 33, at 40. For an influential critique of the asylum adjudication system,
which also explains the background of the Refugee Act of 1980, see David A. Martin,
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sponding to a perception that America had "lost control of [its] bor-
ders," the Attorney General in July 1981 renounced the practice of
parole and announced a new policy of detaining undocumented ex-
cludable aliens.7 3
That policy is now codified in regulations declaring that detention
is the rule for aliens seeking entry who arrive without a valid visa.74
The "parole exception" is reserved for a few narrow categories, in-
cluding aliens with serious medical conditions, pregnant women, and
juveniles who can be released to specific adult relatives.75 Critics con-
tend these regulations unfairly penalize refugees fleeing persecution
in their home country, and are inconsistent with the right to apply for
asylum created by the Refugee Act.7 6 But the INS defends the deten-
tion of undocumented excludable aliens as a necessary deterrent to
stem the flow of "illegal" immigration into the United States.
The detention policy has been implemented, however, in the
midst of an unanticipated volume of asylum seekers that has com-
pletely overwhelmed the asylum adjudication system. Civil war and
strife in Central America, political unrest and violence in Haiti, and
similar crises across the globe have sparked an enormous demand for
asylum. 8 Unfortunately, the system is also clogged with frivolous
Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 PA. L. REv.
1247, 1257-66 (1990).
73. Administration's Proposals on Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint Hearing
Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law and the Sen-
ate Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981), quoted in
Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 980; see also Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 4-8 (1st Cir. 1987);
Arthur C. Helton, The Legality of Detaining Refugees in the United States, 14 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 353, 356-60 (1987).
74. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (1994). The regulations distinguish between two categories of
aliens seeking entry. Excludable aliens who appear with fraudulent documents or no docu-
ments, or who arrive "at a place other than a designated port of entry, shall be detained."
Id (emphasis added). In contrast, aliens who arrive at a proper place with facially valid
documents but who appear inadmissible for other reasons may be detained or paroled,
depending on whether they are a security risk or appear likely to abscond. 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.3(c); see 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, § 8.09[1].
75. 8 C.F.R. § 212(5)(a) (1994); see KuRZBAN, supra note 36, at 61-62.
76. See Helton, supra note 73, at 367-81; Deborah M. Levy, Detention in the Asylum
Context, 44 U. PrTT. L. REv. 297, 316-28 (1983); Maurice A. Roberts, Some Thoughts on
the Wanton Detention of Aliens, 5 GEo. IMMIGR. L3. 225, 235 (1991).
77. This justification was repeatedly expressed when the new detention policy was
adopted. See Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 979-80. The INS still contends the detention of un-
documented excludable aliens is a deterrent to "illegal" entry, although the policy has been
applied inconsistently and often toward persons with colorable asylum claims. See GAO
DETEMON REPORT, supra note 65, at 35-37; infra note 110.
78. During the 1970s, the INS received asylum applications at a rate of between 1900
and 5800 per year. ALEINIXOF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY, supra note
45, at 767. The number of applications skyrocketed in the 1980s. In fiscal year 1981, 61,568
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claims. 9 By December 1994, asylum officers faced a staggering back-
log of over 425,000 asylum applications awaiting adjudication. 0 The
long wait for asylum processing has contributed to the trend toward
longer detention stays for alien detainees.81
The second component of the expanded INS detention mission is
a new emphasis on detaining "criminal aliens." The INS uses this
term to describe aliens who are subject to exclusion or deportation
proceedings because they have been convicted of a crime. 2 The
asylum cases were filed with the INS. The number of affirmative applications jumped to
101,679 in fiscal year 1989. SARAH IGNATIUS, HARVARD LAW Sc-., AN AssEssmErr OF
THE ASYLUM PROCESS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 31-32 (1993)
[hereinafter NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PRoJEcr FINAL REPORT] (tabulating INS statis-
tics) (on file with author). In fiscal year 1994, 147,605 asylum applications were filed with
the INS. INS Finalizes Asylum Reform Regulations, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1577,1578
(1994) [hereinafter INS Finalizes Regulations].
79. The INS has been receiving an increasing number of "boilerplate" applications-
forms with minimal information virtually identical to hundreds of others. Some of these
are prepared by unscrupulous "immigration consultants" who take advantage of unsus-
pecting aliens. Gregg A. Beyer, Reforming Affirmative Asylum Processing in the United
States: Challenges and Opportunities, 9 Loy. L.A. IN'L & CoMP. L.L 43, 70 (1994); see
also INS Finalizes Regulations, supra note 78, at 1578 (INS official estimates that 25% of
new asylum applications may be "abusive"); Lizette Alvarez & Lisa Getter, U.S. ill-
equipped to weed out opportunists, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 15, 1993, at 1A, 22A. But see
NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT FINAL REPORT, supra note 78, at 70 (INS erroneously
returning unique applications as "boilerplate"). In the past, asylum applicants could obtain
a work permit upon filing their application, so long as their claim was not "frivolous." 8
C.F.R. § 208.7 (1994). The vast majority of requests for work authorization filed with asy-
lum claims were approved. NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECr FINAL REPORT, supra
note 78, at 67 (91% approved in fiscal year 1992; 83% in fiscal year 1993). The INS re-
cently promulgated new regulations providing asylum applicants will not be eligible to ap-
ply for work authorization until 150 days after their applications are filed. 59 Fed. Reg.
62,284, 62,299 (1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.7)
80. INS Finalizes Regulations, supra note 78; see also NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PRO-
mar FINAL REPORT, supra note 78, at 35-36 (318,800 pending cases after 11 months of
fiscal year 1993). The new asylum regulations are intended to reduce this backlog by
streamlining the asylum adjudication process. INS Finalizes Regulations, supra note 78, at
1579. But see Deborah Anker, The Mischaracterized Asylum Crisis: Realities Behind Pro-
posed Reforms, 9 Loy. L.A. INT'L COMp. L.J. 29 (1994) (arguing misperceptions about the
asylum adjudication system have fueled these procedural reforms.) The INS also plans to
add more asylum officers and immigration judges to speed claims processing. Steven
Greenhouse, U.S. Moves to Halt Abuse in Political Asylum Program, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
1994, at A8.
81. FIVE-YEAR DETENTION PLAN, supra note 64, at 15-17; OFICE OF Tm INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. 1-92-18, INSPECTION OF DETENTION FACILI-
TIES IN THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 12-14 (1993) [hereinafter IN-
SPECTOR GENERAL DETENTION REPORT].
82. The criminal grounds for exclusion, listed in INA § 212(a)(2), include crimes "in-
volving moral turpitude," drug offenses, and multiple criminal convictions for which the
alien was sentenced to five or more years confinement. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1994).
Aliens who have already entered the United States can also be deported for criminal of-
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"criminal alien" label has gained widespread usage but can be some-
what misleading. Some "criminal aliens" have been convicted of rela-
tively minor offenses, and would shed the "criminal" classification
upon completion of their prison term if not for their alien status.
Others are lawful permanent residents who have lived in the United
States for years.83
Aliens who are incarcerated for criminal offenses generally can-
not be deported until after they are released from prison.84 Neverthe-
less, the INS can initiate exclusion or deportation proceedings while
criminal aliens are still imprisoned. Recent amendments to the INA
require the INS to "begin any deportation proceedings as expedi-
tiously as possible after the date of the conviction." 5 The INS is au-
fenses; the deportation grounds are similar but not identical to the criminal exclusion
grounds. See INA § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994). In addition, entry without
inspection is a separate ground for deportation. INA § 241(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1)(B) (1994). Thus, alien offenders who have entered illegally can be deported
even if their offense is not included among the specific criminal grounds for deportation.
83. IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT, AMERICAN CIVuL LIBERTIES UNION, JuSTICE DE-
TAINED: CONDITIONS AT THE VARICK STREET IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTER 4
(1993) [hereinafter VARIcK STREET REPORT]; see also Deborah Sontag, Porous Deporta-
tion System Gives Criminals Little to Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at Al; Alisa Solo-
mon, Yearning to Breathe Free, ViLLAGE VOIcE, Aug. 8, 1995 at 25.
84. INA § 242(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(h) (1994). The United States has treaties with 34
countries providing for the voluntary transfer of alien prisoners to their home countries.
But very few transfers are accomplished under these treaties. From 1987 to February 1991,
only 1385 federal prisoners were returned to their home countries. Criminal Aliens: Hear-
ings on H.R. 723, H.R. 1067, H.R. 1279, H.R. 1459, H.R. 1496, HR. 2041, H.R. 2438, H.R.
2730, H.R. 2993, H.R. 3302, H.R. 3320 (Ti, IV), H.R. 3860 (Tits. I, V, VI), H.R. 3812, and
H. Con. Res. 47 Before the Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees of
the House Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 169 (1994) (testimony of Kathleen M.
Hawk, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons); see also Danielle Starkey, Deporting illegal
aliens convicted of felonies, CAL. J., Oct. 1, 1993 (only seven California prisoners trans-
ferred to Mexico from 1988-1993); U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMS-
GRATION POLICY: RESTORING CREDmLITY 161-62 (1994) (1994 report to Congress)
(recommending increased use of treaty transfer provisions). The INS and the State of
Florida have instituted a pilot program under which imprisoned deportable aliens "re-
ceive[] clemency from prison terms in their homelands in exchange for agreeing to be
deported and never to return, and to waive any pending legal challenge." 24 Criminal
Aliens in Florida Deported to Free Prison Space, N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 1994, at A20.
85. INA § 242(i), 8 U.S.C. §1252(i) (1994). The INS created its Institutional Hearing
Program ("IHP") to fulfill this statutory mandate. Under this program, some deportation
hearings are conducted on-site at prisons, while aliens are incarcerated. Other alien pris-
oners are sent to the Oakdale, La. detention facility during the last six months of their
prison term for expedited deportation hearings. See generally Removal of Criminal and
Illegal Aliens: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the
House Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 25, 1995), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File
[hereinafter Criminal Aliens Oversight Hearing, Mar. 25, 1995] (testimony of T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (explaining IHP
program); IMMIGRATION AND NATuRALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRA-
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thorized to file a detainer to inform prison officials when an
incarcerated alien is under investigation for possible deportation.
Aliens subject to a detainer are taken directly into INS custody after
completing their prison term.8 6
Until recently, the INS seldom deported criminal aliens immedi-
ately after their release from prison. Indeed, the agency had no way
to identify aliens who had been convicted of a crime.87 Those criminal
aliens who were subject to deportation proceedings frequently were
not detained, and many failed to appear for their hearings88
Members of Congress, expressing outrage at this failure to deport
criminal aliens, have recently catapulted this issue to the top of the
agency's agenda. 9 Congress has passed several amendments to the
TION ACT OF 1990 REPORT ON CRIMINAL ALIENS 6-7 (1992) [hereinafter INS CRIMINAL
ALIENS REPORT] (report to Congress). There are mixed reports on whether the IHP pro-
ceedings provide adequate due process protection to deportable aliens. Compare U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/GGD-90-79, CRIMINAL ALIENS: PRISON DE-
PORTATION HEARINGS INCLUDE OPPORTUNrriEs TO CONTEST DEPORTATION 9 (1990)
(concluding immigration judges at IHP hearings took necessary steps to inform aliens of
their rights provided by law) with Jessica Ladd, Deported to Oakdale: A Due Process Anal-
ysis of Hearings for Criminal Aliens, IMMIGR. NEWSL. (National Immigration Project of the
Nat'l Lawyers Guild, Boston, Mass.), Spring 1990, at 1 (noting serious deficiencies in de-
portation proceedings at Oakdale, La., aggravated by the fact that Oakdale's remote loca-
tion makes it virtually impossible for detainees to obtain legal representation).
86. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a) (1994); see KURZBAN, supra note 36, at 142-144; Orozco v. INS,
911 F.2d 539, 541 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).
87. See INS CRIMINAL ALIENS REPORT, supra note 85, at 4, 7 (noting difficulties the
INS has faced in identifying criminal aliens for deportation, and conceding that "many
criminal aliens are unknown to the INS, even though convicted and incarcerated"); U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/IMTEC-90-75, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE LACKS READY ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL
DATA 4 (1990) (concluding incomplete and inaccurate information has hindered criminal
alien deportation); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIGGD-88-3, CRIMINAL ALIENS:
INS' ENFORCEMENT AcIvrrms 17-30 (1987) (stating "[n]o one knows how many deport-
able criminal aliens exist").
88. See generally PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, CRIMINAL ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 48,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 23-24 (1995) [hereinafter SENATE CRIMINAL ALIENS REPORT]
(through 1992, nearly 11,000 criminal aliens convicted of aggravated felonies failed to ap-
pear for deportation hearings); see also Lisa Getter & Lizette Alvarez, Kicking out
criminals, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 12, 1993, at 19A; Sontag, supra note 83, at Al.
89. The Immigration Act of 1990 required the INS to file a report with Congress docu-
menting its efforts to increase deportation of criminal aliens. Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 510,
104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994)); see INS CRIMINAL ALIENS RE-
PORT, supra note 85. Since then, the INS criminal alien strategy has been the subject of
numerous congressional oversight hearings. See, e.g., Criminal Aliens Oversight Hearing,
Mar. 25, 1995, supra note 85; Criminal Alien Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
International Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 23,
1994), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File; Criminal Aliens in the United States:
Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov-
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INA designed to ensure more criminal aliens are deported.90 Among
these is a requirement that the INS take all excludable and deportable
aliens who have been convicted of an "aggravated felony" into cus-
tody immediately upon their release from prison.91 Excludable aliens
who have committed aggravated felonies can be paroled from immi-
gration detention only when their home country will not accept their
return and the Attorney General has determined they are not danger-
ous.92 Deportable aggravated felons can be released only if they are
"lawfully admitted aliens" who can demonstrate they are not a threat
to the community and are likely to appear before any scheduled hear-
ing.9 3 The population of criminal aliens in immigration detention has
swelled under these provisions.94
ernmental Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1993). Congress generally has been critical of
the INS criminal alien initiatives. See SENATE CRIMINAL ALmENS REPORT, supra note 88
(contending INS system of identifying and deporting criminal aliens is in disarray, despite
recent reforms); see also Ronald J. Ostrow, INS Assailed for Not Deporting Immigrant
Criminals, L.A. TiMEs, Nov. 10, 1993, at A13.
90. For a summary of the recent "piecemeal" amendments to the INA impacting crim-
inal aliens, see SENATE CRIMINAL ALNs REPORT, supra note 88, at 10-12. Additional
reforms are now pending before Congress, as part of antiterrorism and immigration reform
legislation. See generally House Republicans Introduce Bill to Rewrite Immigration Policy,
72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 829 (1995) [hereinafter Republicans Introduce Bill]; Senate Ap-
proves Anti-Terrorism Legislation, House Likely to Follow, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASEs 834
(1995).
91. INA § 236(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(e)(1) (1994); INA § 242(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(A) (1994). An "aggravated felony" includes, inter alia, murder, drug and fire-
arms trafficking offenses, money laundering, and any crime of violence or theft offense for
which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least five years. INA § 101(43), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(43) (1994). The category of crimes that constitutes an "aggravated felony" is rap-
idly expanding as Congress continues to add new crimes to the statutory definition of this
term. See Kenneth H. Stem, The Noose Tightens: Trends and Developments in the Immi-
gration Consequences of Criminal Convictions, in 2 1995-96 Immigration and Nationality
Law Handbook 305, 308 (R. Patrick Murphy et al. eds., 1995) (noting "[i]t is almost impos-
sible to keep track of the rapidly expanding list of aggravated felonies").
92. INA §§ 236(e)(2), 243(g), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(e)(2), 1253(g) (1994).
93. INA § 242(a)(2)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)-(B) (1994). This provision has
been interpreted to establish a rebuttable presumption against release of lawfully admitted
deportable aggravated felons. See 3 GORDON ET AL., supra note 40, § 72.03[4][c][ii]. These
recent amendments have created a new category of INS detainees, "non-releasable aggra-
vated felons," who, like the Marielito Cubans discussed infra notes 270-273 and accompa-
nying text, face indefinite detention because their home country refuses to accept their
return. While the number of "lifers" confined by the INS under these provisions is rela-
tively small, a growing number of countries have refused to allow the return of their na-
tionals who have been convicted of serious crimes within the United States. See Dianne
Klein, INS "Lifers" Locked Up in Limbo, L.A. TimEs, Feb. 6, 1994, at Al.
94. GAO DETENTION REPORT, supra note 65, at 17.
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C. Mission Impossible: Actual Detention Operations
The INS cannot, however, confine all aliens who have been con-
victed of a crime (or even all who have been convicted of an aggra-
vated felony) pending deportation or exclusion proceedings.95 The
same is true for undocumented excludable aliens, who receive parole
far more frequently than the governing regulations seem to contem-
plate.96 In reality, the INS has the capacity to confine only a very
small fraction of the aliens targeted for "mandatory" detention.
The INS now operates nine immigration detention facilities, eu-
phemistically known as "Service Processing Centers (SPCs)."97 An
additional detention center run jointly by the INS and the Bureau of
Prisons is used primarily to confine criminal aliens.98 The INS also
makes extensive use of "contract" facilities operated by private, for-
profit corporations.99 In addition, the INS obtains about twenty-five
percent of its total detention capacity through ad hoc arrangements
with state and local jails.10
95. SENATE CIumINAL ALmENS REPORT, supra note 88, at 2,23-24; see also GAO DE-
TENTION REPORT, supra note 65, at 41; Alvarez & Getter, Detention: The Failed Deterrent,
supra note 5, at 1A.
96. See Susan Freinkel, INS May Loosen Detention Policies, TEx. LAWYER, Feb. 17,
1992 at 4 (INS representative Duke Austin concedes the INS "can't do what the policy is-
to detain exclusion cases"); MacNeil Lehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast, June 7,
1993), available in NEXIS, News Library, Script File (INS district director in New York
explaining in June 1993, only 3-4% of inadmissible aliens arriving at Kennedy airport were
detained).
97. INS Service Processing Centers are located in Aguadilla, P.R.; Boston, Mass.; El
Centro, Cal.; El Paso, Tex.; Florence, Ariz.; Miami, Fla.; New York, N.Y.; Los Fresnos,
Tex.; and San Pedro, Cal. The nine SPCs have a combined rated capacity of 2549 detention
beds. Containing Costs of Incarceration of Federal Prisoners and Detainees: Hearing
Before the House Appropriations Comm. (Apr. 6, 1995), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Cngtst File [hereinafter Hearing on Containing Costs] (testimony of James A. Puleo, Exec-
utive Associate Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service); see also IMMI-
GRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, DETENTION AND
DEPORTATION PROGRAM 3 (June 29,1994) [hereinafter INS DETENTION BRIEFING PAPER]
(citing a rated capacity of 2238 beds) (on file with author).
98. The INS uses approximately half of the one thousand beds at the joint INS/BOP
(Bureau of Prisons) facility in Oakdale, La. to house criminal aliens. INS DETENTION
BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 97, at 3.
99. In April 1995, the INS relied on five contract facilities with a total capacity of 1095
beds. Hearing on Containing Costs, supra note 97 (testimony of James A. Puleo). An
additional contract facility in Eloy, Ariz. contains 500 beds devoted to criminal aliens. Id
100. FIVE-YEAR DETENTION PLAN, supra note 64, at 15, 22-23. As of March 31, 1995,
about 1700 beds were being used in state and local jails. Hearing on Containing Costs,
supra note 97 (testimony of James A. Puleo).
Summer 1995] CHALLENGING CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT 1107
On average, the INS detains between five and six thousand ex-
cludable and deportable aliens on any given day.10 1 This reflects a sig-
nificant increase in detention capacity over the last two decades. 1°2
The agency plans to expand even more aggressively in coming years; it
has proposed a forty-eight percent increase in detention bedspace for
fiscal year 1996.103
Nevertheless, despite this rapid expansion of detention capacity,
the INS reports it has been detaining significantly fewer aliens in re-
cent years.1' 4 This anomaly is largely the result of the trend toward
longer detention stays.'05 While the INS has more detention space, it
now incarcerates fewer aliens because those already confined are held
for much longer periods. 6
101. The Detention and Deportation Division's daily population count of alien detain-
ees fluctuated between five and six thousand for most of fiscal year 1994. Letter from Joan
C. Higgins, Assistant Commissioner, Detention and Deportation Division, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, to Margaret H. Taylor, Wake Forest University School of Law
(n.d.), at Attachment 2 (Detention Space Status Report-FY 94) (on file with author). The
daily population count rose slightly in September and October of 1994. Id. On October 3,
1994, for example, the INS detained 4794 aliens in its SPCs and contract facilities, and 1842
in state and local jails, for a total of 6636 detainees. Id. at Attachment 1 (Daily Population
Report, Oct. 3, 1994); see also FVE-YEAR DETNTION PLAN, supra note 64, at 16 (citing
detention capacity of 6600 beds for fiscal year 1990); GAO DENTION REPoRT, supra
note 65, at 37 (6259 beds for fiscal year 1992). These figures do not include all of the
Marielito Cubans in INS custody, many of whom are confined in state and local jails and
Bureau of Prison facilities. See infra notes 270-273 and accompanying text. Nor do they
count the Haitian and Cuban migrants (at times as many as 40,000) who were detained in
"safe haven" camps run by the U.S. military at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in 1994. See infra
note 142.
102. The INS has more than tripled its detention capacity since 1975 by building five
SPCs and opening its contract facilities. See FIVE-YEAR DEm nON PLAN, supra note 64,
at 15 (noting in 1975 the INS operated four SPCs with a total capacity of 1382 beds).
103. Hearing on Containing Costs, supra note 97 (testimony of James A. Puleo) (noting
funds requested for fiscal year 1996 will provide an additional 1636 detention beds in state,
local, and contract facilities, as well as 976 beds in two new INS SPCs). Some bills now
pending before Congress would also authorize the INS to use closed military bases to de-
tain aliens awaiting exclusion or deportation proceedings. See, e.g., Republicans Introduce
Bill, supra note 90, at 830.
104. FrvE-YEAR DETENION PLAN, supra note 64, at 15. In fiscal year 1982, the INS
detained 229,135 aliens, representing approximately 24% of total apprehensions. Although
the number of apprehensions increased over the next several years, both the real number
and percentage of apprehended aliens who were detained dropped dramatically. In fiscal
year 1991, for example, seven percent (approximately 84,000) of the 1,200,000 aliens appre-
hended by the INS were detained. Id In fiscal year 1994 (most recent figures available),
the INS detained a total of 81,707 aliens. Hearing on Containing Costs, supra note 97
(testimony of James A. Puleo).
105. See supra note 65.
106. FIvE-YEAR DETTON PL"N, supra note 64, at 15-16. In fiscal year 1982, 92% of
the aliens apprehended by the INS were from Mexico. Mexican detainees averaged less
than two days in detention, while detainees from other countries were held an average of
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Ironically, the new "mandates" to detain virtually all undocu-
mented excludable aliens and aggravated felons may actually rein-
force this trend. These mandates, by prohibiting the release of many
detained aliens, help to create a population of long-term detainees
who languish in confinement. 10 7 Moreover, the governing statutes
and regulations do not allocate scarce detention resources in a sensi-
ble manner. While the INS purports to have a "uniform detention
policy nationwide," field officers must exercise discretion to choose
among competing detention priorities.0 8 The result is a detention sys-
tem "so random, so illogical, so arbitrary that it fails in [many] crucial
missions."'1 9
The controversial practice of detaining asylum seekers provides
one illustration. Until recently, the INS had no guidelines to focus its
detention resources on what would seem to be the logical targets:
those who abuse the asylum system by filing frivolous applications.
Instead, the agency sometimes used detention as a deterrent, singling
out applicants from a particular country or region, such as Haiti or
Central America, who often presented credible asylum claims.110 For
19 days. Id. at 15. In fiscal year 1991, 48% of detained aliens were from countries other
than Mexico; their average detention stay was 41 days. Id. at 16. The INS reports this
increase in the average length of stay "has, of necessity, had a major adverse impact on INS
detention operations." Id.
107. See Klein, supra note 93, at Al (noting potential growth of the "non-releasable
aggravated felon" population).
108. In July 1993, the Acting Commissioner of the INS issued a memorandum to field
officers setting detention priorities, stating "[ilt is our policy to have a uniform detention
policy nationwide." The memorandum noted "statutory requirements mandat[e] compul-
sory INS detention for some types of cases," but at the same time instructed District Direc-
tors and Chief Border Patrol Agents to "ensure that appropriate discretion is exercised in
making custody determinations." The memorandum also explicitly conceded that "we can
only apply these detention guidelines within available INS resources." Memorandum from
Chris Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service to District Di-
rectors, et al. (July 23, 1993) (emphasis added) (on file with author). A recent investigative
report on INS detention concluded "in reality, there is no [single] detention policy. There
are as many policies as there are INS bosses." Alvarez & Getter, Detention: The Failed
Deterrent, supra note 5, at 24A; see also Solomon, supra note 83, at 25.
109. Alvarez & Getter, Detention: The Failed Deterrent, supra note 5, at 1A.
110. See GAO DETENTION REPoRT, supra note 65, at 35-37 (discussing "three efforts
to reduce the flow of aliens entering illegally," which targeted aliens from Haiti, Central
America, and China for detention); see also Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 979-84 (S.D.
Fla. 1982) (describing new policy of detaining undocumented excludable aliens, which was
intended to "regain control" of our borders and had a disproportionate impact on Hai-
tians); Roberto Suro, U.S. Is Renewing Border Detentions, N.Y. Ti, Es, Feb. 8, 1990, at A22
(describing detention efforts in Texas to deter asylum applicants from Central America);
Roberto Suro, Despite U.S. Pledge, Detainees Languish, WAsH. PosT, Dec. 20, 1994, at A3
(detention of Chinese intended to deter alien smuggling). These ad hoc detention efforts
have been controversial because they have targeted aliens fleeing countries in turmoil, who
1108
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those not subject to these targeted detention efforts, only pure luck,
the availability of local detention space, and the unchecked discretion
of low-level officials would separate those asylum seekers who re-
ceived parole from those who suffered in long-term detention."'
In 1992, the INS finally began interviewing detained asylum seek-
ers to identify those with potentially valid claims for possible pa-
role.112 But this policy has faltered from a lack of commitment and
resources."13 Even under the current asylum pre-screening program,
some applicants with a well-founded fear of persecution in their home
country remain incarcerated, while others who have abused the sys-
often had good reason to seek protection in the United States, even if they did not fulfill
the statutory definition of a refugee. See generally Helton, supra note 73, at 373-76. The
use of detention as an ad hoc deterrent has also raised the specter of national origin dis-
crimination. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Haitians were detained be-
cause of invidious discrimination. But this decision was vacated by the en banc court on
the ground that the Haitians, as excludable aliens, could not claim equal protection under
the Constitution. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated, 727 F.2d 957
(11th Cir. 1984).
111. See Alvarez & Getter, Detention: The Failed Deterrent, supra note 5, at 1A
(describing several instances where excludable aliens were caught by seemingly arbitrary
detention decisions); Diego Ribadeneira, 35 Haitians Detained in Texas, BosTON GLOBE,
Oct. 1, 1994, at 28 (Haitians detained in Miami, where detention space was short, received
parole; others similarly situated, who had previously been transferred to less-crowded facil-
ities in Texas, would not be released); Letter from Lory Rosdnberg, Director, American
Immigration Law Foundation, to Dennis DeLeon, Human Rights Commissioner, City of
New York 2 (Aug. 31, 1993) (citing statement by INS official in New York that aliens
arriving at Kennedy Airport were confined on a "first come, first detained" basis; those
arriving after spaces were filled for the day received parole) (on file with author).
112. Memorandum from Gene McNary, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service to All Regional Administrators, et al. (Apr. 20, 1992), reprinted in 69 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 526 (1992).
113. See generally LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DETENTION OF REFUGEES:
PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ASYLUM PRE-ScREENINO OFFICER PROGRAM
(1994) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT ON APSO PROGRAM]. This study, con-
stituting the first comprehensive assessment of the so-called "APSO" program, concluded:
[t]he program has achieved a principal objective by identifying at least some de-
tained asylum applicants for whom detention is not warranted [,] thereby increas-
ing the INS's ability to use its detention capability in a rational manner.
However, over two years since the APSO program went into [e]ffect, there re-
main serious problems with its enforcement.
Id at 9-10. Among these problems are district directors who have disregarded APSO of-
ficer recommendations to parole detained aliens and some evidence of national origin dis-
crimination in parole decisions. Id. at 10-12. The report recommended the APSO program
be codified in regulations. Id. at 18.
The INS has not issued a formal evaluation of the APSO program, but noted in its
report on the Esmor detention facility in New Jersey that "a stronger APSO program"
would "help the INS to make wise use of detention space while addressing humanitarian
concerns raised by extended detention of credible asylum seekers." INS ESMOR REPORT,
supra note 8, at 54. The INS Esmor report also concluded "[a] stronger APSO program
will require an additional dedication of resources." Id.
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tem (along with some aliens who have committed serious crimes) go
free.114
There is little hope the INS can outgrow these problems by con-
tinuing to expand its detention capacity, although the agency now
seems to be pursuing this rather dubious course." 5 Many critics of
immigration detention have noted the grave humanitarian concerns
raised by the "wanton detention of aliens," even apart from the seri-
ous problems with conditions of confinement." 6 The current program
of aggressive expansion ignores these pressing issues, and still will not
provide sufficient capacity to meet the "mandatory" detention re-
quirements of the existing legal framework." 7 Moreover, some immi-
gration reform proposals now pending before Congress would, if
enacted, only increase the strain on the immigration detention system
by adding additional unrealistic mandates." 8
In the meantime, the INS remains overwhelmed by its impossible
detention mission. And thousands of aliens face long-term confine-
ment in the custody of an agency stretched beyond its capacity.
114. See generally Alvarez & Getter, Detention: The Failed Deterrent, supra note 5, at
IA; LAWYERS COMMITrEE REPORT ON APSO PROGRAM, supra note 113, at 12, 14; SEN-
ATE CRIMINAL ALIENS REPORT, supra note 88, at 2, 23-24.
115. See supra note 103 (noting INS plans to expand its detention capacity by 48% in
fiscal year 1996).
116. The phrase is borrowed from Maurice Roberts, supra note 76; see also Helton,
supra note 73; Schuck, Transformation of Immigration Law, supra note 33, at 68-69 (not-
ing "[t]he prolonged incarceration of thousands of aliens, most of them innocent victims of
severe economic deprivation, indiscriminate armed conflict, or intense political persecution
has seared the judicial conscience as few events since the civil rights struggle of the 1950s
and 1960s have done"). Professor Schuck's assessment of the judicial response to the
claims of detained aliens was written before initial court victories were vacated, reversed,
or undermined by later decisions. More recently, most INS detention practices (including
the refusal to grant parole to excludable aliens who present pressing humanitarian con-
cerns) have been upheld by courts employing a very deferential standard of review. See
supra note 57; infra note 284.
117. Available estimates suggest, for example, approximately 20% of the federal and
state prison population-about 120,000 prisoners-are deportable aliens. These figures do
not take into account the increasing flow of alien offenders into the prison system. GAO
DETNTION REPORT, supra note 65, at 38 (estimating over 72,000 aliens will be arrested
yearly on felony drug charges). Even taking into account various reforms, such as the IHP
and APSO programs, the GAO investigation of immigration detention concluded "[w]e do
not believe that it is feasible to expand the INS detention capabilities sufficiently to solve
the [agency's enforcement] problems." Id. at 43.
118. Efforts to Control Illegal Immigration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion and Claims of the House Judiciary Comm. (June 29, 1995), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Cngtst File (testimony of T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Executive Associate Commis-
sioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (noting provisions in pending legislation
requiring even more immigration detention would tie up INS detention space and could
prevent the INS from detaining criminal aliens).
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II. Conditions of Confinement at Immigration
Detention Facilities
The rapid expansion of immigration detention predictably has re-
sulted in serious problems with conditions of confinement. Although
alien detainees are held in civil confinement, they sometimes are in-
carcerated "under conditions as severe as we apply to our worst
criminals.""' 9 INS detention facilities, like prisons and jails across the
country, too frequently do not meet minimum requirements for hu-
mane detention.
Some alien detainees also face unusually harsh conditions stem-
ming from practices unique to immigration detention. First,
deplorable conditions of confinement have resulted whenever the
United States has detained large groups of potential refugees for pro-
longed periods to deter their fellow countrymen from seeking asylum
in the United States. 20 Second, the INS confines aliens in state and
local jails or private facilities without adequate oversight. Some de-
tainees confined in these "non-Service" facilities have been subjected
to abuse or inhumane detention conditions because the INS has
looked the other way or has failed to make even the most basic ar-
rangements for their care.
This section summarizes the disturbing INS record of confining
aliens in substandard detention facilities,' 2 ' focusing on conditions of
119. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981) (describ-
ing prevailing conditions for the Marielitos detained in overcrowded prisons in the early
1980s).
120. As was the case with the Marielito Cubans, a brief period of detention may be
necessary to screen and process a large, and sometimes unexpected, volume of aliens seek-
ing entry. But the confinement conditions suffered by Haitians, Central Americans, and
the most recent wave of Cubans-groups held for much longer periods, in part to deter
other asylum seekers from their home countries-demonstrate the need to develop a more
humane response to so-called "immigration emergencies." See infra note 197 and accom-
panying text; see also U.S. COMM'N ON IMMI1GRATION REFORM, supra note 84, at 162-74.
121. Unfortunately, the personal stories of would-be immigrants detained by the INS
cannot be captured in this overview of conditions problems. Justice Brennan reminds us
"it is impossible for a written opinion to convey the pernicious conditions and the pain and
degradation which ordinary [persons] suffer" when they are confined in facilities that do
not meet constitutional standards. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354 n.3 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp 1265, 1391 (S.D. Tex. 1980)). Several
advocacy organizations (and most recently the INS itself) have issued reports that together
provide a comprehensive picture of the poignant plight of INS detainees. See INS ESMOR
REPORT, supra note 8; WOMEN'S COMM'N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, A CRY
FOR HELP: CHINESE WOMEN IN INS DETENTION (1995) [hereinafter CHINESE WOMEN IN
DETENTION]; VARICK STREET REPORT, supra note 83; BRUTALITY UNCHECKED, supra
note 4, at 54-66; MINNESOTA LAWYERS INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS & PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, HIDDEN FROM ViEw: HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN THE KROME DETENTION
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confinement and physical abuse suffered by both excludable and de-
portable aliens."2 I do not contend that every example in this section
unquestionably violates the Constitution, but rather that many colora-
ble due process claims arise from the conditions of immigration deten-
tion.'23 A survey of the available evidence demonstrates serious
conditions problems are endemic at alien detention facilities. 124
CENTER (1991) [hereinafter KItRoM REPORT]; ACLU DETENTION REPORT, supra note 4;
COORDINATING COMM. ON IMMIGRATION LAW, LrvEs ON THE LINE: SEEKING ASYLUM IN
SOUTH TEXAS 10-13 (1989) [hereinafter LivEs ON THE LINE]; LAWYERS COMM. FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES: A
CRUEL AND QUESTIONABLE POLICY 22-28 (1989) [hereinafter DETENTION OF ASYLUM
SEEKERS]; Lynn Marcus, Detention Conditions in INS and Contract Facilities in the South-
west, IMMIGR. NEWSL. (National Immigration Project of the Nat'l Lawyers Guild, Boston,
Mass.), Winter 1989, at 1. For first-person stories of individual INS detainees, see LAW-
YERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & HELSINKI WATCH, MOTHER OF EXILES (1986) [here-
inafter MOTHER OF EXILES]; see also Solomon, supra note 83, at 25.
122. For the most part, excludable and deportable aliens are confined together, and
thus subject to the same conditions of confinement. See Schmidt, supra note 11, at 321.
Mariel Cubans, however, usually are not detained in INS SPCs or contract facilities, but
instead are confined in prisons or jails. FIVE-YEAR DETENTION PLAN, supra note 64, at 18-
19. In addition, Haitians and Cubans who were interdicted and detained at "safe haven"
camps at Guantanamo Naval Base inhabited a legal limbo. The government successfully
argued that they could not claim even the limited statutory and constitutional protections
afforded to "excludable" aliens because they were held outside the territory of the United
States. See Cuban Am. Bar Assoc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995). But see
Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1041-45, (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (Haitians de-
tained at Guantanamo can claim due process protection) (vacated per settlement
agreement).
123. Under the Due Process Clause, noncriminal detainees are protected from any con-
dition or practice amounting to "punishment" of the detainees. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535 (1979). But allegations of mere negligence do not state a due process violation.
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 327 (1985). Courts are divided over how to apply the Bell v.
Wolfish test, and in particular over its relationship to Eighth Amendment precedent. The
Fifth Circuit, for example, has recently granted rehearing en banc for two cases raising this
issue. See infra note 308. In general, "deliberate indifference" has become the touchstone
used by many courts to assess due process claims of inadequate medical care or inhumane
conditions of confinement. 1 MICHAEL MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS, § 3.01, at 132 (2d
ed. 1993).
This article does not undertake the task of sorting out the complex law governing due
process conditions claims. Instead, I invoke the general pronouncements of Bell which
(with two notable exceptions discussed infra note 308) are still cited consistently as control-
ling precedent. I also draw comparisons to Eighth Amendment standards, in part because
the Eighth Amendment has received considerably more attention in the Supreme Court.
See infra notes 330-339. These well-settied touchstones are used to ascertain whether alien
detainees have received a full measure of constitutional protection when challenging the
conditions of their confinement. I conclude that sometimes they have not. See infra notes
303-328, 341-343 and accompanying text.
124. The conditions problems documented in this section are exacerbated by a related,
but no less important, concern: detainees' lack of access to legal counsel. Most INS deten-
tion facilities are located in remote areas, where there is little legal help available. See
GAO DETENTION REPORT, supra note 65, at 46-47; Roshan v. Smith, 615 F. Supp. 901
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A. Overview of Conditions at INS Detention Facilities
The confinement conditions at INS detention facilities vary, both
over time and among facilities.'15 The overall picture, however, is one
of harsh detention conditions similar to-and sometimes worse
than-the prevailing conditions for criminal incarceration.' 26
Severe overcrowding is a recurring source of many conditions
problems. Overcrowding persisted at INS detention facilities through-
(D.D.C. 1985) (dismissing complaint seeking to enjoin construction of remote facility in
Oakdale, La.). Moreover, various INS practices-from frequent transfers to restrictive vis-
iting hours-have hampered detainees' ability to obtain legal representation. See, e.g.,
Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp 1488,1509-11 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Nunez v. Boldin,
537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982); INS Transfer
Policy, supra note 53. I will consider detained aliens' procedural due process challenges to
these practices (as opposed to their substantive due process challenges to conditions of
confinement) in a forthcoming article.
125. This section discusses detention conditions at facilities run by the INS, including
the nine Service Processing Centers and the joint INS/BOP facility at Oakdale, La. I also
refer on occasion to conditions at the "safe haven" camps at Guantanamo Naval Base,
Cuba, which were used to hold Haitians and Cubans interdicted at sea. These camps were
run by the United States military, not the INS. Nevertheless, the Guantanamo camps pro-
vide the most recent example of the deplorable conditions that have resulted whenever the
United States undertakes a massive detention effort in order to deter an influx of asylum
seekers. In essence, the Guantanamo camps exported offshore (and farther from public
and judicial scrutiny) the same conditions problems which prevailed at detention facilities
within the United States used to confine Haitians and Central Americans in the 1980s. See
infra note 142 and accompanying text.
126. Numerous courts and scholars have compared the conditions of immigration de-
tention to criminal imprisonment. See, eg., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Williams, 654 F.2d
1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981) (Marielito Cubans confined in federal penitentiary); Helton,
supra note 73, at 364 (conditions of immigration detention are "generally similar to prison
conditions"); Schuck, Transformation of Immigration Law, supra note 33, at 28 n.149
("Although the INS and the courts routinely employ the term 'detention' to describe the
practice of holding aliens ... the length of many detentions and the conditions of confine-
ment suggest that the term 'imprisonment' more accurately depicts reality"). Others have
used the analogy of concentration camps to describe immigration detention. Michael A.
Olivas, "Breaking the Law" on Principle: An Essay on Lawyers' Dilemmas, Unpopular
Causes, and Legal Regimes, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 815, 821-22 (1991) [hereinafter Olivas,
Breaking the Law] (comparing the "shacks, tents, and makeshift housing" used to confine
alien children to the Japanese concentration camps during World War II); Puerto Rico v.
Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035, 1043 (D.P.R.), vacated per consent agreement sub nom., Mar-
quez-Colon v. Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1981) ("In other times and circumstances the
so-called refugee facility would be referred to as a concentration camp."). Several recent
reports have noted that convicted criminals sometimes fare better than civil immigration
detainees. See VARICK STREET REPORT, supra note 83, at 29 ("Detainees who have served
time for criminal offenses uniformly report that conditions at Varick Street are significantly
worse than in city or state prisons where their sentences were served."); Alisa Solomon,
supra note 83; David Stout, Detention Jail Called Worse than Prison, N.Y. TiMEs, June 19,
1995, at B5; Prison vs. INS Detention: Convicts have More Perks, MiAMI HERALD, Dec. 16,
1993, at 25A [hereinafter Prison vs. INS]; Willa Appel, They Did No Crime But They're
Doing Time, NEWSDAY, Dec. 6, 1993, at 39.
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out the 1980s.127 The INS contends this problem has abated recently,
in part because of funding shortfalls. 28 Nevertheless, some detention
facilities at times still operate above their rated capacities.' 29 Over-
crowding also arises as a serious concern whenever the INS under-
takes a massive ad hoc detention effort.
Soon after the new policy of detaining undocumented excludable
aliens was announced in 1981, for example, the Krome detention
center in Florida was filled more than three times beyond its stated
capacity.' 30  Over a thousand detainees (mostly Haitians) were
crowded into makeshift shelters without adequate sanitation or medi-
cal care.3 1 Conditions at Krome were abhorrent during this period.
Untreated sewage threatened to contaminate the drinking water.
32
The Florida Health Department cited Krome for numerous health
and safety violations, 33 and the state sued to close the facility because
of the severe overcrowding. 134
Similar conditions prevailed when the INS announced a sudden
crackdown to detain asylum applicants at facilities in South Texas in
127. See, eg., Letter from Greg Leo to Sharon Hase (n.d.), in Bureau of Prisons and the
U.S. Parole Commission: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
148 (1995) (noting on May 31, 1984, three out of six SPCs had detainee populations ex-
ceeding stated capacity); Laurie Becklund, Conditions Assailed: Salvadoran Men Languish
in INS Center in Desert, L.A. Timms, Feb. 20, 1985, at B1 (El Centro, Cal. overcrowded);
Liz Balmaseda, "New" Krome a Sign of Growth in Alien Detention, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
12, 1985, at 4D (Krome is often "packed beyond its capacity"); Helton, supra note 73, at
364 ("[o]vercrowding is a recurrent problem" at SPCs); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578,
583 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (noting "crowded conditions" at Los Fresnos, Tex. facility).
128. FIVE-YEAR DETENTION PLAN, supra note 64, at 17; INSPECTOR GENERAL DETEN-
TION REPORT, supra note 81, at 4.
129. See INsPECrOR GENERAL DETENTION REPORT, supra note 81, at 6 (San Pedro
SPC ran "far above" its established capacity from September 1991 to April 1992); VARiCK
STREET REPORT, supra note 83, at 30 (detainees regularly sleep in library so that Varick
SPC can operate at its "maximum" capacity).
130. ACLU DETENTION REPORT, supra note 4, at 19 (1206 Haitians detained at Krome
in July 1981 when the center had a capacity of 524).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Colon v. Carter, 507 F. Supp. 1026, 1028 (D.P.R. 1980).
134. Graham v. Smith, No. 81-1487-Civ-JE (S.D. Fla. 1981), cited in Louis v. Nelson,
544 F. Supp 973, 983 n.27 (S.D. Fla. 1982). This lawsuit was apparently rendered moot
when Congress, in an appropriations bill, directed the Attorney General to "exercise his
best efforts" to ensure no more than 525 detainees were held at Krome after March 1,
1982. See Pub. L. No. 97-92, § 128, 95 Stat. 1198-99 (1981). A report prepared by a human
rights monitoring group in 1991, however, found Krome's population still periodically ex-
ceeded 525. KROME REPORT, supra note 121, at 41.
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1989 and 1990.13' This detention policy was intended to stem the flow
of potential refugees from Central America.'36 The Los Fresnos SPC,
designed to hold 425 detainees, was crowded with an additional 2000
aliens. 137 Predictably, deplorable conditions resulted. Detainees con-
fined at Los Fresnos were packed into tents without access to showers
or clean clothes. 38 Other detainees, including children, were confined
in hastily conceived, substandard temporary facilities. 1 39
Both Krome and Los Fresnos braced for a similar situation in
1994, when thousands of Haitians and Cubans again fled by boat to
the United States. Krome began operating well above its stated ca-
pacity.140 Meanwhile, Los Fresnos again prepared to house thousands
of detainees. Prior experience with the Central American detention
effort prompted the governor of Texas to warn federal officials that
"[a]ny plans to hold detainees in tents, without adequate infrastruc-
135. Suro, U.S. Is Renewing Border Detentions, supra note 110, at A22; Richard L.
Berke, Immigration Official Warns Aliens May be Held in Jail, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 11, 1989,
at A9; Roberto Suro, U.S. Set to Detain Refugees in Tents Beginning Today, N.Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 21, 1989, at Al [hereinafter Suro, U.S. Set to Detain Refugees].
136. The INS Commissioner stated "he hoped to send a message to people seeking
asylum that they face certain detention under conditions that 'won't be like the Ritz Carl-
ton."' Suro, U.S. Is Renewing Border Detentions, supra, note 110. The South Texas deten-
tion effort broke with the usual practice of the INS in that both excludable aliens who
arrived without documents and deportable aliens who had already entered the United
States were detained when they applied for asylum. See Suro, U.S. Set to Detain Refugees,
supra note 135. Noncriminal deportable aliens usually are not subject to detention unless
they present an unusual risk of absconding. See supra note 49.
137. BRUTALrY UNCHECKED, supra note 4, at 58-59; see also Berke, supra note 135, at
A9. The detention effort peaked at about 3600 detainees in the spring of 1989, and was
suddenly renewed again in early 1990. Suro, U.S. Is Renewing Border Detentions, supra
note 110, at A22.
138. BRUTALrry UNCHECKED, supra note 4, at 58-59; see also Robert E. Koulish, Sys-
temic Deterrence Against Prospective Asylum Seekers: A Study of the South Texas Immi-
gration Project, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHAN E 529, 539-43 (1992) (noting serious
problems with conditions of confinement and "a pattern of physical mistreatment against
detainees").
139. See LIVES ON THE LINE, supra note 121, at 11 (describing conditions at various
temporary facilities in South Texas, including a Red Cross shelter where "quarters were
very crowded and strongly ressembled [sic] the conditions in refugee camps abroad"); Oli-
vas, Breaking the Law, supra note 126, at 821-22 (children held in "shacks, tents, and make-
shift housing" had "virtually no access to health care or personal counseling").
140. In August 1994, Krome confined over 600 Cubans, including 107 minors who were
detained despite INS guidelines stating juveniles should be released or transferred to a
juvenile shelter within 72 hours. Attorneys Sue to Free Children, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, Aug. 31, 1994, at 8A. The INS began paroling children from Krome on humani-
tarian grounds in September 1994. Lisa Ocker & Berta Delgado, 37 Cubans Win Release
From Krome, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 16, 1994, at 1A. On October 3, 1994,
the INS Daily Population Report stated Krome had a rated capacity of 200 and held 445
detainees. Letter from Joan C. Higgins, supra note 101, at Attachment 1.
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ture, security, health, or other fundamental services would be unac-
ceptable."' 4 1 The Haitians and Cubans soon were interdicted at sea
and sent to Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba to face similar
conditions. 142
Even when immigration detention facilities are not overcrowded,
they frequently are understaffed. 143 A chronic shortage of INS deten-
tion officers, together with the routine use of poorly trained tempo-
rary employees and contract security guards, contributes to conditions
problems. 44 At the El Centro SPC, for example, detainees were
forced to spend fourteen hours a day outside in the desert sun, where
141. See James Pinkerton, S. Texas Detention Camp Ready for Influx of Cubans, Hous-
TON CHRON., Aug. 26, 1994, at A12 (quoting letter from Texas Governor Ann Richards to
INS Commissioner Doris Meissner, sent by Governor Richards in response to reports that
Los Fresnos had contingency plans to house up to 3500 Cuban detainees). On October 3,
1994, the Los Fresnos facility, with a rated capacity of 350, held 674 detainees. Letter from
Joan C. Higgins, supra note 101, at Attachment 1.
142. Conditions of confinement were a constant concern, and a source of unrest, when
some 40,000 Haitians and Cubans were detained at "safe haven" camps at Guantanamo
during 1994. When the camps were set up, no infrastructure was in place to provide for the
basic human needs of thousands of detainees. See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, Resources
Strained at Guantanamo Bay, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 4, at A12; Patrick J. Sloyan, Guantanamo
AlerL" U.S. Fears Refugees Overtaxing Navy Base, NEWSDAY, Aug. 25, 1994, at A5; Art
Pine, Expanding Refugee Housing Poses Risks, L.A. TuvIEs, Aug. 26, 1994, at A17; Joseph
B. Treaster, Guantanamo: Refugee Camps Fill With Fury, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994, at
Al; Some Haitians Flee Refugee-Camp Conditions, SAN Dioo TRm., July 12, 1994, at
A10. Even as the military worked to improve conditions, observers reported serious defi-
ciencies in sanitation, food distribution, and medical care. See Armando Valladares, Castro
Outfoxes Clinton-and Guantanamo's Detainees Pay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1995 at All
(human rights organization reported "lice- and mange-ridden children .... insufficient
water and milk for infants and ... chronic medical conditions left untreated"); Navarro,
supra (reporting problems with food distribution); Gordon Edes, Canseco Makes A Huge
Hit To Those Left on Cuban Base, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 10, 1994, at 1C
(noting malnutrition and "woeful sanitary conditions"); see also Letter from Harold
Hongju Koh, Director, The Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights at
Yale Law School, to T. Alexander Aleinikoff, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (July 19, 1994) (recommending numerous changes needed to improve condi-
tions for Haitians at Guantanamo) (on file with author).
143. See James LeMoyne, Florida Center Holding Aliens Is Under Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 1990, at A16 (INS officials concede Krome operates "with only half the guards
who are needed"); KRoME REPORT, supra note 121, at 49; FIVE-YEAR DETENTION PLAN,
supra note 64, at 17 ("an insufficient number of personnel" caused the INS to "underu-
tilize" its SPCs).
144. The Varick Street facility has repeatedly been criticized for using contract guards
who "time and again ... have displayed an inability or unwillingness to perform their
duties in a manner that will meet even minimal standards." VARicK STREET REPORT,
supra note 83, at 13 (quoting internal report prepared by the New York INS district). Cur-
rently, about 40% of the detention officer staff at INS SPCs are contract employees. Hear-
ing on Containing Costs, supra note 97 (testimony of James A. Puleo); see also KROME
REPORT, supra note 121, at 49 (half of the Krome detention officers are temporary employ-
ees who do not undergo full INS training).
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temperatures regularly exceeded one hundred degrees, simply be-
cause there were not enough security guards to supervise the air-con-
ditioned barracks during the day.145 And at the San Pedro SPC, the
INS assigned male guards to the bathrooms and dorms of female de-
tainees due to a shortage of female detention officers.' 46
Access to medical care is another frequently cited problem at
alien detention facilities. The clinic facilities at most Service Process-
ing Centers are generally deemed sufficient. 147 But adequate medical
care is not always provided, particularly for pregnant women and de-
tainees with psychiatric or chronic health problems." Again, the
problem is especially acute during ad hoc detention efforts. In 1993, a
federal court condemned the deliberate refusal by the INS to provide
appropriate treatment for HIV-positive Haitians detained at Guanta-
namo as "outrageous, callous, and reprehensible."' 149
145. Judith Cummings, Aliens Staging Hunger Strike at Detention Camp, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 1985, at A12. This practice was discontinued in July 1985 after the INS hired addi-
tional contract guards. Detainees at El Centro are now allowed inside during parts of the
day. ACLU DETENTION REPORT, supra note 4, at 99; BRUTALITY UNCHECKED, supra note
4, at 58 n.187. Other facilities in extremely hot climates, however, have also confined de-
tainees outdoors during most of the day. ACLU DETENTION REPoRT, supra note 4, at 107-
08 (facilities in El Paso and Port Isabel, Tex.).
146. Prison vs. INS Detention, supra note 126, at 25A.
147. KROME REPORT, supra note 121, at 44-48 (Krome Public Health Service Clinic "is
quite adequate and meets contemporary standards"); VAmCK STREET REPORT, supra note
83, at 44 n.138 (independent consultant was "generally impressed" with the medical unit,
but was unable to evaluate quality of treatment because site observers were not permitted
to speak to obtain consent to review detainees' medical records). Five INS SPCs are medi-
cally accredited by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care. INS DETEN-
TION BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 97, at 3.
148. See VARICK STREET REPORT, supra note 83, at 44-46 (detailing complaints about
medical care); BRUTALrrY UNCHECKED, supra note 4, at 59-60 (adequate care not pro-
vided for those with serious medical conditions; at most SPCs there are no psychiatric
facilities); ACLU DETENTON REPORT, supra note 4, at 19 (pregnant women at Krome did
not receive adequate nutrition). See also Solomon, supra note 83 (reporting HIV-positive
detainee was unable to get prescription medicine, and detainee denied access to a walker
was forced to drag himself across the floor); Fleeing persecution, couple found new anguish,
MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 16, 1993, at 24A (San Pedro detainee did not receive adequate nutri-
tion or medical care when she was pregnant; baby died after being born three months
premature); Louis Dubose, The Last Refuge." Asian Immigrants in Texas Jails, TEx. OB-
SERVER, Apr. 24, 1992, at 1, 10 (Bayview doctors failed to diagnose AIDS-related opportu-
nistic infection). Complaints about inadequate medical care at INS detention facilities
have been raised in two class action lawsuits now pending in California. See supra note 31.
149. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (vacated
per settlement agreement). The INS conceded medical facilities at Guantanamo were not
sufficient to provide treatment for AIDS patients, yet refused to consider the recommen-
dations of camp doctors that certain HIV-positive detainees be medically evacuated to the
United States. Id at 1044.
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The conditions at INS detention facilities are exacerbated by the
increasingly longer detention stays for alien detainees. The INS Ser-
vice Processing Centers were not designed for long-term confine-
ment.150  At the Varick Street SPC, for example, aliens are
incarcerated for months or even years in crowded "dorm" rooms
designed for detention of less than one week, with no opportunity to
go outdoors. 5' Programmed activities routinely provided to prison
inmates under generally accepted standards for long-term detention
are not available to many INS detainees.5 2 The "excruciating bore-
dom"'15 3 and harsh conditions of immigration detention have triggered
hunger strikes and riots by detainees attempting to call attention to
their plight.154
B. Detention Conditions at "Non-Service" Facilities
One such uprising recently succeeded in bringing both INS and
public scrutiny to the conditions of confinement at "contract" deten-
tion facilities. In June 1995, violence erupted at the alien detention
facility run by Esmor Correctional Services Corporation in Elizabeth,
New Jersey.'-5 The riot was preceded by reports of abuse and inhu-
150. KROME REPORT, supra note 121, at 14; VARIcK STREET REPORT, supra note 83, at
6; BRUTALITY UNcHEcKED, supra note 4, at 57; DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS, supra
note 121, at 22; Prison vs. INS Detention, supra note 126, at 25A.
151. VARicK STREET REPORT, supra note 83, at 11, 32-33. The lack of outdoor exercise
has long been a source of tension at Varick Street. Both New York City and the State of
New York correctional standards require outdoor exercise for their detention facilities.
See id. at 33; see also Solomon, supra note 67, at A21 (detainee at Varick Street denied
access to the outdoors for over four years).
152. When an independent consultant visited the Varick Street facility, for example, the
exercise room was of "poor quality," lacking equipment the INS previously agreed to pro-
vide under a settlement decree. There were no educational programs and limited work
opportunities. VARiCK STREET REPORT, supra note 83, at 34-36. The consultant con-
cluded Varick Street failed to comply with standards for detention articulated by the
American Correctional Association and INS standards for the operation of detention facil-
ities. Id. at 7. But see KRomE REPORT, supra note 121, at 39 (Krome recreational facilities
deemed "quite adequate" in 1991).
153. VARICI STREET REPORT, supra note 83, at 34 (detainees commonly mentioned
"sleep" as their primary activity, and their chief complaint was "nothing to do").
154. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, "Processing" for Haitians Is Tune in a Rural Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 1992, at D18 (hunger strike at Krome); James Bennet, Illegal Aliens and
Guards Hurt in Melee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1991, at B9 (at least four hunger strikes in six
years to protest conditions at the Varick Street SPC); Cummings, supra note 145, at A12
(Central American detainees stage hunger strike to protest conditions at El Centro SPC);
Haitians at 2 Detention Sites Refusing to Eat and to Talk, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1981, at A8.
155. Richard Perez-Pena, Aliens' Melee Closes Center in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 1995, at Al; Elizabeth Llorente et al., Tinderbox Explodes in Elizabeth, BERGEN REC.,
June 19, 1995, at Al.
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mane treatment of detainees at the Esmor facility.156 In response to
this criticism, the INS had commenced an investigation of conditions
at Esmor the week before the detainee disturbance; its investigation
was expanded to include inquiry into the riot.157 The INS cancelled its
New Jersey contract with Esmor after completing its investigation. 58
In the aftermath of the riot, both the press and INS issued reports
highly critical of Esmor's New Jersey facility. The INS found the low-
paid Esmor guards did not receive effective supervision or even the
minimal training specified in its contract. 5 9 Detainees were fre-
quently subject to harassment and physical abuse as "part of a system-
atic methodology... to control the general detainee population.' ' 60
Theft of detainee property was widespread. 6 ' Unfortunately, Esmor
supervisors and INS personel-both on site and at the INS District
Office-turned a blind eye and ignored repeated well-founded com-
plaints about mistreatment of alien detainees. 62
156. Most notable were claims of widespread physical abuse by guards and unnecessary
shackling of detainees. See Llorente, supra note 7, at Al.
157. INS ESMOR REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
158. Ashley Dunn, U.S. Inquiry Finds Detention Center Was Poorly Run, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 22, 1995, at Al. Esmor still operates an alien detention facility in Seattle, Wash. Id.
159. The INS report noted Esmor recruited guards at the salary level of "[t]he typical
warehouse guard," instead of offering the competitive wage for guards "who [are] also
responsible for the welfare and security of persons." INS ESMOR RE-PORT, supra note 8, at
16. When the contract was awarded, the INS had ignored warnings that the salary pro-
posed by Esmor was "unrealistic" and created a high risk Esmor could not meet the re-
quirements of the contract. Sullivan & Purdy, supra note 6, at Al. Esmor indeed had
trouble hiring guards and was so short-staffed that many of its employees were forced to
work two consecutive eight-hour shifts. This practice was permitted since the INS contract
failed to specify the number of security personnel needed to staff the facility adequately,
and instead left this decision (along with many other vital matters) to the discretion of the
for-profit corporation running the facility. INS ESMOR REPORT, supra note 8, at 14, 33.
The INS report also found Esmor put guards on duty without obtaining the requisite secur-
ity clearance or providing any training. Id. at 16-20. This was particularly problematic
since Esmor guards routinely operated without supervision from INS or Esmor personnel.
Id. at 7, 12-13.
160. INS ESMOR REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
161. Id. at 9. The INS report noted many Esmor detainees on the brink of deportation
refused to board their outgoing flights without their funds and valuables, which had been
confiscated by Esmor guards. Id.
162. The INS concluded its on-site personnel did not provide adequate oversight, in
part because of inexperience and frequent turnover. Id. at 35-37. The INS claimed it was
"kept in the dark" about changes in the operations at Esmor, but at the same time noted its
district office did not respond to repeated complaints. Id. at 13, 38-39 (citing three unan-
swered letters from pro bono attorneys). The INS report recommended 24-hour oversight
by INS personnel at contract detention facilities, noting such round-the-clock supervision
"is not the current INS policy nationally for these types of contracts." Id. at 35.
1119
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22:1087
The operation of the Esmor facility raises fundamental questions
about the wisdom of delegating responsibility for detainee welfare to
private, for-profit corporations. 63 The INS report traced many of the
problems at Esmor to its method of contracting for private detention
and to inadequate oversight at the facility."6 Still, the agency con-
tends Esmor was an isolated situation. 65 Yet similar problems have
emerged at other private facilities. Two less-publicized disturbances
at the Eloy, Arizona contract facility, for example, were linked to low
pay and minimal training for contract guards, along with "shortages of
food, soap, toilet paper, and other essentials.' 66
Questions of oversight also loom large when aliens are confined
in state and local jails. 167 Too frequently, the INS has contracted with
jails that do not provide humane conditions and adequate care for
alien detainees. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, INS officials in
Lubbock, Texas confined over 7000 aliens in local jails pursuant to
informal, oral agreements. 68 The jails were not inspected or ade-
quately maintained. 69 Detainees were crowded into "squalid" cells
163. These questions have repeatedly been raised by critics of prison privatization. See
Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 69 JUDICATURE 325
(1986), reprinted in 40 VAr. L. REv. 813 (1987); James T. Gentry, Note, The Panopticon
Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353 (1986); David N.
Wecht, Note, Breaking the Code of Deference." Judicial Review of Private Prisons, 96 YALE
L.J. 815 (1986); see also Maureen Castellano, Incarceration Incorporated, N.J. L.J., July 10,
1995, at 1.
164. One prevailing criticism was that the INS statement of work, used nationwide to
solicit bids for contract detention facilities, sets performance-based specifications leaving
far too much discretion with the for-profit contracting entity. INS ESMOR REPORT, supra
note 8, at 33, 60 ("a flaw in the original statement of work did not place a requirement on
the contractor ... to increase staffing proportionate to detainee levels").
165. In the wake of the Esmor disturbance, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner directed
each INS District Director with jurisdiction over an SPC or contract facility to conduct a
special site visit to ensure each facility was providing proper care and treatment for alien
detainees. See Elizabeth Llorente, Immigration Chief Orders Detention Center Visits, BER-
GEN REc., June 23, 1995, at N9. She later conceded the Esmor situation "does raise for us
broader issues of whether we're doing everything we can do in privatization," but stated
she thought the problems at Esmor were an exception to the usual operation of contract
facilities. Dunn, supra note 158.
166. Miriam Davidson, Workers: Shortages Sparked Prison Riots, ARiz. REPUBLIC,
Dec. 27, 1994, at B1.
167. About 25% of the bedspace for immigration detention is obtained through per
diem contracts with local law enforcement agencies. FIE-YEAR DETENTION PLAN, supra
note 64, at 16. As of March 31, 1995, the INS was using about 1700 beds in state and local
jails to confine aliens. Hearing on Containing Costs, supra note 97 (testimony of James A.
Puleo).
168. Ortega v. Rowe, 796 F.2d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013
(1987).
169. IL
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filled with trash. Jail officials did not provide mattresses or blankets,
and detainees were forced to sleep on cardboard boxes or on the
floor, 7 0 There was no regular supervision of aliens in detention.171
The Fifth Circuit found that INS and local jail officials had "blindly
assum[ed] away" the obligation to care for the detainees. 72
The INS has since adopted a jail inspection program to monitor
the conditions at non-Service detention facilities. 73 But this program
still does not ensure minimally adequate conditions of confinement.
First, state and local jails must meet only four mandatory criteria to be
certified for INS use: twenty-four hour supervision; compliance with
safety and emergency codes; food service; and availability of emer-
gency medical care. 74 The mandatory criteria do not address impor-
170. Id.
171. The district court found the supervision of alien detainees to be adequate, despite
the fact that no one regularly checked on detainees at any facility. In Lubbock, aliens were
confined in a city jail that was closed for routine operations, with no jailer on duty. Ortega,
No. CA-5-81-198 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 1985), reprinted in Appendix B to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Apr. 20, 1987) (No.
86-1143). "Supervision" was provided by police officers in another part of the building
who were "within hearing range of the detention cells." Id. at 18a. At the City of Slaton
jail, "supervision" was provided by a female dispatch officer within earshot who was not
authorized to go back into the detention area, but was instructed to call a male officer if
she heard a disturbance. Id. at 19a. At the Haskell jail, "supervision" was provided by the
sheriff who lived upstairs. "[1]f prisoners or detainees in the jail needed help or any service
they were instructed to hit a pipe which ran through the cells into the sheriff's bedroom."
Id. at 21a.
172. Ortega, 796 F.2d at 768-69. The Fifth Circuit nevertheless held the "lamentable
conditions" in the Lubbock area jails resulted from mere negligence that did not rise to the
level of a due process violation. Id. The court was surely wrong in concluding "[b]lindly
assuming away one's responsibilities ... can be seen as unreasonable-nothing more"
when the "responsibility" at issue is the obligation to provide adequate care for detainees
in government custody. Id. at 769. In a case decided after Ortega, the Supreme Court
explained "when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his
will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility
for his safety and general well-being." DeShaney v. Department of Social Serv., 489 U.S.
189, 199-200 (1989). For a related critique of the Ortega court's analysis, see infra note 308.
173. The INS drafted guidelines for jail inspections in December 1992, and formally
initiated an inspection program in early 1983. Ortega, No. CA-5-81-198 (N.D. Tex. July 23,
1985); see also Memorandum from J. F. Salgado, Associate Commissioner of Enforcement
to Regional Commissioners (Dec. 23, 1982) (on file with author). The INS issues a quar-
terly report on its jail inspection program, primarily noting the number of inspections com-
pleted and the number of jails yet to be inspected for each region. Under "Significant
Findings," the report notes the total number of discontinued jails since February 1983. On
September 30, 1994, 240 jails had been disqualified 'nder the INS jail inspection program.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Non-Service Detention, Jail
Inspections Report # 41 (quarter ending Sept. 30, 1994) (on file with author).
174. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(0 (1994). Despite this regulation, not all non-Service facilities
used by the INS meet even these minimal standards. See infra note 179 (INS knowingly
confined aliens at a local jail that did not feed the detainees).
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tant concerns such as sanitation, adequate nutrition, and
overcrowding. Second, the INS does not always execute written con-
tracts setting minimum standards for detention conditions in the local
jail.175 As a result, serious conditions problems persist because the
INS continues to "assume away" the responsibility to provide ade-
quate care for detainees confined at non-Service facilities. 176
In the Chicago area, for example, the INS secured detention
space through informal arrangements with local jails and municipal
lock-ups on a "space available" basis. As a result, some alien detain-
ees spent months on end in a bizarre detention rotation system, where
they were transferred daily among various facilities not designed for
long-term confinement. The detainees often lacked toothbrushes and
clean underwear; they were seldom allowed to exercise or shower. At
one municipal lock-up, they were not even fed.17 7
175. See Ortega v. Rowe, 796 F.2d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013
(1987). The INS Chicago district office did not execute written contracts with local jails,
specifying the services to be provided to alien detainees until the filing of Imasuen v.
Moyer, No. 91-C-5425, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1449 (N.D. III. Aug. 27, 1991).
176. A recent report by the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
confirms the continuing conditions problems at some local jails used to confine INS detain-
ees. CmNsE WOMEN IN DETENTON, supra note 121. A delegation of the Commission
visited Chinese women held in the New Orleans Parish Prison and the Hancock County
Justice Facility in Mississippi. The delegation was not allowed inside the New Orleans
Parish Prison to view the detainees' living quarters, despite repeated requests. Id. at 10.
Interviews with the women held there painted a grim picture of long-term detention in
unsuitable facilities. The women had no access to reading materials, were not allowed to
keep any personal belongings, and "reported that they lie on their beds all day staring at
the ceiling." Id. at 9.
177. This account is based on the pleadings filed in Imasuen, including the uncontested
affidavits of INS detainees and the sworn statements of various INS officials. See State-
ment of Material Facts in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgement at 9-16
(describing detention rotation system), 21-32 (food service inadequate, and not available at
one facility), 34-40 (cell conditions inadequate for long-term detention), 41-49, 50-55, 64-69
(municipal lock-ups were not required to provide personal hygiene items, clean clothing,
showers, or out-of-cell recreation), Imasuen (No. 91-C-5425); see also Alvarez & Getter,
Detention: The Failed Deterrent, supra note 5 (reporting on the Chicago detention rotation
system while noting INS detainees were not fed at one holding facility).
As this article was going to press, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, and granted summary judgment for the INS on most of these claims.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Imasuen v. Moyer, No. 91-C-5425, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12176 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 1995). Much of the court's description of the "undis-
puted" facts forming the basis for its grant of summary judgment incorporated changes
made by municipal facilities and the INS after the lawsuit was filed. See id at *1 (noting
settlement agreements resolving conditions claims were reached with the municipal de-
fendants); id at *10 (prior to 1992, detainees fed microwaved meals, but since 1992 they
received hot lunches ordered from restaurants); id at *13 (detainees provided outdoor
recreation since 1992). As a result, the court overlooked some of the plaintiffs' key allega-
tions, including the fact detainees were not fed at the Maybrook facility. See id. at *9-*12
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Each of these local jails had passed INS inspection-demonstrat-
ing the remarkable shortcomings of the current minimum standards
for non-Service detention and the jail inspection program. INS jail
inspectors in Chicago assumed their supervisors would investigate
problem reports and discontinue the use of local jails not in compli-
ance with minimum standards. Yet various supervisors disclaimed any
responsibility for deciding which jails to use, and stated that they re-
viewed inspection reports only to ensure the forms were filled out
completely. 78 The INS continued to use substandard jails even when
its own inspection reports noted serious deficiencies. 79 It was not un-
til 1991, when a class action lawsuit was filed, that some of these
problems abated. 80
The problem of inadequate INS oversight has been particularly
acute for stowaways.' 8' Until recently, the INS required commercial
carriers to take custody of stowaways who pressed claims for asylum
pending final adjudication of their applications. 18  Some stowaways in
(discussion of plaintiffs' complaints about food did not mention Maybrook). The court's
summary judgment also was premised on finding detainees whose hearing dates were more
than one month away were transferred to appropriate long-term facilities, when the plain-
tiffs' factual allegations contradicted this assertion. Compare id. at *3 (stating long-term
detainees were sent to long-term facilities) with Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts, at
10 (Plaintiff Obi was confined by the INS for five months, Plaintiff Imasuen for four
months, and for much of this time they were shuttled between various short-term holding
cells), Imasuen (No. 91-C-5425).
178. Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts at 16-20, Imasuen (No. 91-C-5425) (summa-
rizing affidavits and deposition testimony of INS officials).
179. Id. at 24 (two inspection reports noted INS detainees were not being fed at one
facility; additional reports noted insufficient food service at other facilities). The district
court opinion granting summary judgment did not discuss these facts or consider the jail
inspection program.
180. See supra note 177.
181. Stowaways, a "disfavored" class under the INA, are subject to immediate expul-
sion upon arrival. See INA §§ 237(a)(1), 273(d), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1), 1323(d) (1994),
explained in Dia Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 1259 (3d Cir. 1994). Stowaways
who file an asylum claim, however, are entitled to a limited administrative hearing. Yui
Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983).
182. Carriers have been fighting this policy, with some success, in court and in Con-
gress. In Dia Navigation, the Third Circuit concluded the INS carrier detention policy was
a legislative rule, invalid because it should have been promulgated pursuant to the notice
and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 34 F.3d at 1256. A contem-
poraneous district court decision struck down the INS policy as inconsistent with recent
amendments to the INA, which assess a "user fee" on carriers to fund, inter alia, INS
detention of excludable aliens. Linea Area Nacional de Chile v. Sale, 865 F. Supp. 971
(E.D.N.Y. 1994). Despite these litigation losses, the INS was planning to promulgate regu-
lations reiterating its rule of carrier detention when Congress interceded, passing an
amendment to the INA shifting this responsibility back to the INS. See Michael S.
Lelyveld, INS Plans to Bypass Cour4 Formalize Rule on Carrier Detention of Stowaways, J.
COM., July 21,1991, at Al; William L. Roberts, Congress Hastily Passes Bills on Stowaways,
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private custody were shackled around the clock in run-down hotels;
others were physically abused.'83 Yet the INS disclaimed any respon-
sibility for monitoring the treatment of stowaways, explaining "[w]e
leave [detention conditions] totally up to the carrier."'184
Perhaps the most poignant stories, however, belong to the chil-
dren confined by the INS, most often in non-Service facilities.
Thousands of unaccompanied minors have been held pending depor-
tation or exclusion proceedings, often under "highly inappropriate de-
tention conditions."'I 5 It took years of litigation to win victories for
these children, including an end to routine strip searches'8 6 and a con-
sent decree that requires the INS to release unaccompanied minors or
transfer them to a licensed juvenile care facility.187 Still, the INS at
times has ignored its obligation to detain children in appropriate and
J. COM., Oct. 12, 1994, at Al. This legislative victory for carriers may be short lived, as
some pending immigration reform bills would again allow the INS to require carriers to
take custody of stowaways. See Michael S. Lelyveld, Bill Would Put Stowaways in Lines'
Care, J. CoM., June 7, 1995, at B8.
183. See Clifford Levy, Stowaways, Seeking Liberty, Are Caught in Limbo of Law, N.Y.
Timms, May 17, 1994, at A2; Michael S. Lelyveld, Shipping Firm Keeps Stowaways in
Shackles, BERGEN REc., May 12, 1994, at Al; see also Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363,
1367 (5th Cir. 1987) (stowaways suffered "gross physical abuse" at hands of harbor police
officials); Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1030, 1031-32 (S.D. Tex. 1984), rev'd, 838 F.2d
800 (5th Cir. 1988) (stowaways detained under inappropriate conditions at private security
firm).
184. Lelyveld, supra note 183. The Third Circuit similarly noted "our attention has
been directed to no set of standards, in the form of regulations or otherwise, concerning
the conditions under which such aliens are detained." Dia Navigation, 34 F.3d at 1257.
185. Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 1014 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher, J., dissenting), va-
cated, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). For several years, the western region of the
INS refused to release unaccompanied minors, except to a parent or lawful guardian.
Other adult relatives and volunteer service agencies were not allowed to take custody of
alien children. Instead, unaccompanied minors were confined "for indeterminate periods,
deprived of education, recreation, and visitation, commingled with adults of both sexes and
subjected to strip searches with no showing of cause." Id. The INS settled that part of the
Flores litigation challenging confinement conditions. See infra note 187. The Supreme
Court ultimately upheld a modified version of the INS juvenile detention policy, which
permitted release to the custody of other adult relatives. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439,
1444-45 (1993).
186. The strip search policy was declared unconstitutional in Flores v. Meese, 681 F.
Supp. 665 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
187. The consent decree requires the INS to act within 72 hours to release unaccompa-
nied minors to an adult relative or to transfer them to an appropriate juvenile care facility.
See Memorandum of Understanding re: Compromise of Class Action: Conditions of De-
tention, Flores (No. 85-4544-RJK). In 1991, INS Commissioner Gene McNary issued na-
tional guidelines that embody similar standards. Memorandum from Office of
Commissioner to Regional Operations Liaison Officers et al. (Dec. 13, 1992), reprinted in
69 INTERPRETER RELEAsEs 205 (1992).
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humane facilities,188 especially in the midst of massive detention ef-
forts. Michael Olivas has described the plight of thousands of Central
American children who were traumatized by the coercive conditions
of INS detention. 89 More recently, a hundred Haitian and Cuban
children were confined at the overcrowded Krome SPC, in violation
of INS policy,190 while many more were held in detention camps at
Guantanamo Bay.'9' The Cuban children were belatedly paroled into
the United States. Some unaccompanied Haitian minors, after being
detained at Guantanamo for almost a year, were forcibly repatriated
back to Haiti.192
C. The INS Response to Conditions Problems
The INS has been slow to correct the serious problems with con-
finement conditions suffered by alien detainees. Too frequently, only
litigation spurs the agency to action. Even then, conditions problems
persist. The deplorable conditions in the Chicago area jails, for exam-
ple, mirror the very problems that surfaced ten years earlier in Lub-
bock, Texas. And court orders and consent decrees requiring the INS
to improve its treatment of alien detainees have sometimes been met
with a pattern of noncompliance. 93
188. See Brief for Southwest Refugee Project, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, and
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, As Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents, Flores (No. 91-905) (citing evidence of noncompliance with Flores consent
decree.) Troubling allegations about the detention of minors continue to emerge. In the
aftermath of the Esmor disturbance, the INS discovered four juveniles who had been con-
fined at Esmor, in violation of INS policy and the Flores decree. Its investigation revealed
"several lapses" in the Newark district's policy of interviewing and finding placements for
unaccompanied minors. INS EsMOR REPORT, supra note 8, at 41. In Los Angeles, the INS
confined an 11-year-old girl in an office for two nights with four unknown, unrelated adult
males. Central Am. Refugee Ctr. v. Reno, No. CV 93-4162-KN (C.D. Cal. June 23, 1995)
(order granting motion for class certification).
189. Olivas, Breaking the Law, supra note 126, at 821-24.
190. Joanne Cavanaugh, Young, Homeless, and "Hyper": Facilities Planned for Krome
Kids, MLAMx HERALD, Aug. 27, 1994, at 22A (reporting 107 children were detained at
Krome despite INS policy to parole children into the community).
191. Edes, supra note 142, at 1C (reporting 3071 Cuban children held at Guantanamo
Bay).
192. See David Beard, Haitian Children Headed Out of Guantanamo, FT. LAUDERDALE
SUN-SENTINEL, June 26, 1995, at 4A; Bob Herbert, Suffering the Children, N.Y. Tims,
May 27, 1995, at A19 (reporting on forced repatriation of some unaccompanied Haitian
children); Diego Ribadeneira, U.S. to Ease Restrictions for Cuban Children, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 3, 1994, at 2; Joanne Cavanaugh, Children, Mothers Leaving Krome, MIAMI
HERAL.D, Sept. 16, 1994, at 1A (Cuban children receive humanitarian parole into the
United States).
193. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F.2d 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988), affd, 919 F.2d 549
(9th Cir. 1990). In Orantes-Hernandez, the district court issued a permanent injunction
against the INS after documenting numerous instances where the INS had failed to comply
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To its credit, however, the INS has recently taken some steps to
improve conditions of confinement at alien detention facilities. The
INS has sought voluntary accreditation for its Service Processing Cen-
ters and contract facilities, a process requiring these facilities to con-
form to generally accepted guidelines for long-term detention.194 The
INS has also renovated and expanded some of its SPCs.195 Moreover,
in the wake of the Esmor riot, the INS Commissioner ordered inspec-
tions of INS detention facilities to ensure they were providing ade-
quate conditions and humane treatment for alien detainees. 96
These efforts, while laudable, do not correct the root causes of
the conditions problems at immigration detention facilities. More
fundamental reforms are needed. The United States must find a more
humane response to the large-scale migration of persons seeking ref-
uge in the United States, in order to avoid the severe overcrowding
and deplorable conditions inevitably resulting from massive detention
efforts.1 97 And as the Esmor situation has painfully illustrated, the
with the dictates of a preliminary injunction, requiring, inter alia, some changes in the
operation of INS detention facilities. In some cases, this noncompliance was due to a
"standard pattern of officially sanctioned behavior" and bad faith on the part of the INS.
Id at 1498, 1504. Government counsel also conceded "the agency is powerless to com-
pletely control its employees." Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 373 (C.D.
Cal. 1982) (preliminary injunction in same litigation); see also Brief for Southwest Refugee
Project, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, and the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Flores (No. 91-905) (citing
evidence of noncompliance with Flores consent decree). Cf Kevin R. Johnson, Respond-
ing to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Privacy over
Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REv. 413, 447 (1993) (documenting the INS pattern of "overem-
phasizing enforcement at the expense of immigrants' rights").
194. Telephone Interview with Joan Higgins, Assistant Commissioner, Detention and
Deportation, Immigration and Naturalization Service (August 2, 1994). Currently, five im-
migration detention facilities are medically accredited by the National Commission on
Correctional Health Care. Three contract facilities and two Service Processing Centers
have American Correctional Association (ACA) accreditation; the INS expected an addi-
tional facility to receive ACA accreditation in 1994. INS DETENiON BRIEFING PAPER,
supra note 97, at 3. ACA accreditation, however, does not ensure a facility provides hu-
mane treatment to its detainees. The Esmor contract facility provides a stark example.
While Esmor was accredited by ACA, the INS investigation revealed several instances
where the physical plant fell short of ACA standards. INS ESMOR REPoRT, supra note 8,
at 25-26. There is also some question whether ACA standards, primarily used to judge the
adequacy of prisons designed to punish criminals, are the appropriate guidelines for the
civil detention of aliens awaiting deportation proceedings.
195. INS DETENTION BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 97, at 3.
196. Llorente, supra note 165, at N9.
197. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, From "Refugee Law" to the Law of "Coerced
Migration," 9 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 25 (1994); Grover J. Rees, Refugee Policy in
an Age of Migration, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 249,259-62 (1994); Bill Frelick, Needed:
A Comprehensive Solution for Cuban Refugees, 72 INTERPRETER RELEAsES 121 (1995);
Arthur C. Helton, Immigration Parole Power: Toward Flexible Responses to Migration
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INS must provide sustained oversight, and higher minimum standards,
for the non-Service facilities used to confine aliens.
Even if these reforms were adopted, however, it is likely that seri-
ous conditions problems would still persist at alien detention facilities.
Immigration detention, like criminal incarceration, is marked by a
lack of adequate resources, public apathy toward conditions of con-
finement, and a "voteless, politically unpopular, and socially threaten-
ing" population of detainees.198 Under these circumstances, "judicial
intervention is indispensable if constitutional dictates-not to mention
considerations of basic humanity-are to be observed.' 199
HL. "Only the Most Perverse Reading of the Constitution":
Due Process Protection to Challenge Conditions of
Confinement
Unfortunately, courts have not always interceded when alien de-
tainees allege unconstitutional confinement conditions. The main ob-
stacle to these claims is the so-called "plenary power doctrine," a
century of precedent mandating extreme judicial deference to Con-
gress and the executive branch in matters involving immigration. This
deference comes at the expense of aliens' constitutional rights. In
short, the plenary power doctrine carves out a unique space in Ameri-
can public law: a realm where the Constitution does not always apply.
The rest of this Article explores the impact of the plenary power
doctrine on the conditions claims of alien detainees. It would seem
that "[o]nly the most perverse reading of the Constitution would deny
detained aliens the right to bring constitutional challenges to the most
basic conditions of their confinement." 2" Under the plenary power
doctrine, however, perverse readings of the Constitution frequently
prevail. I contend that the plenary power doctrine has silently and
improperly infiltrated some cases adjudicating the conditions claims of
aliens in immigration detention.
Emergencies, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1637 (1994). The U.S. Commission on Immigra-
tion Reform, in its 1994 report to Congress, recommended that "policy approaches for
handling immigration emergencies are needed to provide more effective and humane re-
sponses to such recurrent phenomena." U.S. COMM'N ON IMMGRATON REFORM, supra
note 84, at 174.
198. Justice Brennan identified these factors as contributing to the "pervasive neglect"
of our nation's prisons in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 357-58 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
199. Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring).
200. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 874 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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A. The Plenary Power Doctrine
1. Foundation Cases
At the heart of the plenary power doctrine lies the belief that
Congress and the executive branch must have unfettered authority to
admit, exclude, or deport aliens. The doctrine has its roots in the late
nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court upheld various provi-
sions of the Chinese Exclusion Act, which embodied Congress's in-
creasingly draconian restrictions on Chinese immigration. In the
Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme Court rejected the constitu-
tional claim of a Chinese immigrant who was excluded upon returning
from a trip abroad.2° ' The petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of
twelve years, had obtained a certificate before he left that entitled him
to re-enter the United States under then-existing law.202 But he was
stranded outside the United States when Congress, without notice,
amended the Chinese Exclusion Act, declaring such certificates "void
and of no effect. 2 3
The Court upheld this provision, suggesting there could be no
limit on congressional power to exclude aliens from the United
States.21 The Court reasoned the "power of exclusion of foreigners
[is] an incident of sovereignty belonging to the Government of the
United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the
Constitution. '2°5 As such, any constitutional challenges to Congress's
exercise of the exclusion power "are not questions for judicial
determination. '206
The Court soon extended this rule of judicial deference to allow
Congress plenary authority to deport resident aliens from the United
201. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
202. Id at 582.
203. Id at 599.
204. This is the traditional interpretation of the Chinese Exclusion Case, bolstered by
later cases that reiterate in similar terms this principle of plenary power. See Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (stating the power over admission and
exclusion "belongs to the political departments of the government"); Oceanic Steam Navi-
gation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320,339 (1909) (noting "[o]ver no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete"); United States ex reL Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) (concluding "it is not within the province of any court... to
review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given
alien"). Stephen Legomsky has argued, however, that the plenary power doctrine is pre-
mised on a misreading of the Chinese Exclusion Case, and that the Court "never intended
to preclude judicial review of all Congressional exercises of the exclusion power." STE-
PHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY 193 (1987).
205. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609.
206. It
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States. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,20 7 the Court refused to in-
tercede on behalf of Chinese immigrants who were to be deported
because they had failed to obtain certificates of residence, as required
under additional amendments to the Chinese Exclusion Act. Aliens
caught without such certificates were subject to deportation unless
they could show by the testimony of "at least one credible white wit-
ness" that they were lawful residents of the United States. 08 The
Fong Yue Ting Court upheld this provision. 0 9 As in the Chinese Ex-
clusion Case, the Supreme Court concluded it was beyond the compe-
tence of the courts to review immigration legislation.210
The Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting seem antiquated
in a modem constitutional setting. The Supreme Court's analysis was
tainted by the racist backlash against Chinese laborers that motivated
Congress to pass these provisions.211 Moreover, the past one hundred
years have seen a remarkable expansion of constitutional rights, which
would seem to call into question many of the Supreme Court's nine-
teenth century pronouncements on immigration. Yet the plenary
power doctrine has flourished for over a century, isolating immigra-
tion law from this constitutional revolution. Indeed, more recent
Supreme Court cases embrace the plenary power doctrine in decisions
with startling implications for detained aliens seeking to challenge the
conditions of their confinement under the Constitution.
2. Knauff and Mezei. Denying Due Process to Excludable Alien
Detainees
During the Cold War, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the plenary
power doctrine in two cases that "come close to saying that even
though the Fifth Amendment due process protection applies to all
'persons,' we simply do not regard excludable aliens as falling within
207. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
208. Id at 704.
209. Id. at 732.
210. Id. at 731.
211. In the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme Court spoke approvingly of Con-
gress's motives in passing the Chinese Exclusion Act. The Court compared Chinese immi-
gration to a foreign invasion, concluding that "[ilt matters not in what form such aggression
and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character,
or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us." The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. at 606. In both the Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting, the Court suggested
that Congress had reason to require corroboration of the testimony of Chinese immigrants
because of the "loose notions entertained by [Chinese] witnesses of the obligation of an
oath." I. at 598; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
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that category. 212 In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,11 3
the Court upheld the Attorney General's authority to exclude, with-
out a hearing, the wife of a United States citizen. Ellen Knauff had
served as a civilian employee of the United States War Department in
Germany and sought to immigrate under the War Brides Act of
1945.214 She was excluded when the Attorney General concluded,
without any explanation, that her admission "would be prejudicial to
the interests of the United States."21
Knauff had been confined on Ellis Island for over a year without
being informed of the charges against her. 6 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court denied her habeas corpus petition. Relying on nine-
teenth century plenary power cases, the Court concluded "it is not
within the province of any court... to review the determination of the
political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien.' 2 17 The
Court's analysis was distilled in the statement "[w]hatever the proce-
dure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned.
2 18
Three years after this decision, the Court "accomplished the im-
probable feat of rendering the Knauff outcome even more severe 219
in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei. 0 Here the Court deter-
mined that Ignatz Mezei, the husband of a United States citizen who
had lawfully resided in the United States for twenty-five years, could
212. David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Polit-
ical Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 165, 176 (1983) [hereinafter Martin, Due
Process and Membership].
213. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
214. See id at 539-40.
215. Id
216. Id.
217. Id at 543.
218. Id at 544. Charles Weisselberg recently has delved into the history of Ellen
Knauff, and concludes her full story reveals the folly of such extreme judicial deference to
the Attorney General's decision to exclude her summarily. Charles D. Weisselberg, The
Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons From the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz
Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995) [hereinafter Weisselberg, Lessons from Knauff and
Mezei]. After much public outcry, several rounds of habeas corpus litigation, and congres-
sional hearings focused on her plight, Knauff was paroled from Ellis Island and allowed to
contest the Attorney General's decision at an exclusion hearing. The hearing board upheld
her exclusion, but their decision was reversed by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
When she was finally afforded a hearing, Knauff was able to refute conclusively uncorrobo-
rated hearsay testimony suggesting she had passed classified information gleaned from her
employment to Czech authorities. The Board of Immigration Appeals held there was no
substantial evidence to support Knauff's exclusion. See id. at 958-64; see also ELLEN
KNAUFF, THE ELLEN KNAUFF STORY (1952).
219. ALEINiKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY, supra note 45, at 385.
220. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
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be excluded and detained without a hearing upon returning from a
nineteen month sojourn abroad 21 Mezei had "seem[ed] to have led a
life of unrelieved insignificance" 22 until the Attorney General, decid-
ing Mezei was a threat to national security, excluded him on the basis
of confidential information.223 He had been confined on Ellis Island
for almost two years when a district court ordered his release.' 24 Nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court, reversing the lower court's grant of
habeas corpus, concluded Mezei should be "treated as if stopped at
the border" for purposes of his due process claim?225
The majority opinion assiduously avoided any frank description
of Mezei's imprisonment on Ellis Island, instead referring to his "tem-
porary harborage" as "an act of legislative grace."' 6 But the dissent-
ing justices emphasized that upon his return to Ellis Island, Mezei
could be "detained indefinitely, perhaps for life, for a cause known
only to the Attorney General."' 227 Still, the Supreme Court found no
due process violation, repeating "[w]hatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned." 2 8
221. Mezei had sailed for Europe in May 1948 to visit his dying mother in Rumania. Id.
at 208. After being refused permission to enter Rumania, he was stranded in Hungary for
19 months because of difficulties in securing an exit visa, probably due to the "disturbed
conditions of Eastern Europe" at that time. Id at 208; id. at 219 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 219 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
223. The Attorney General refused even to divulge in camera the reasons for Mezei's
exclusion. Id. at 209.
224. Id. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
225. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215. The Court concluded Mezei's detention on Ellis Island
"bestow[ed] no additional rights," relying on long-standing precedent that detention does
not constitute an "entry" in the United States. Id. at 213, 215 (citing Kaplan v. Tod, 267
U.S. 228, 230 (1925); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 661 (1892)). The
Court also held Mezei's long-term residence in the United States did not confer due pro-
cess protection. Id. at 213-14. This part of the Mezei Court's holding was later modified in
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982), in which the Court reasoned a lawful perma-
nent resident who had been "absent from the country only a few days" was entitled to
invoke procedural due process protection in exclusion proceedings. The Plasencia Court
declined to reconsider Mezei, instead distinguishing the earlier opinion on its facts, empha-
sizing Mezei's absence from the United States had been "extended." Id. at 33-34.
226. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215.
227. Id at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also id. at 217 (Black, J., dissenting). Mezei
had tried to no avail to find another country of refuge; at least 14 other nations had also
refused to accept him. See id. at 219-20 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
228. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (quoting United States ex reL Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537,544 (1950)). Mezei, like Ellen Knauff, was ultimately afforded a hearing after the
Supreme Court upheld his summary exclusion. He was charged with being a member of
the Communist party, based on his participation in the Hungarian Working Sick Benefit
and Education Society (later a Hungarian lodge of the International Workers Order).
Mezei denied that he was a member of the Communist party, but these charges were up-
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This chilling statement denies due process protection to excluda-
ble aliens even when they are detained within the United States. It
also marks an important distinction between aliens in exclusion and
deportation proceedings, because deportable aliens can claim proce-
dural due process protection." 9 Since "the INS intermingles deport-
able and excludable aliens without any distinction as to the conditions
of confinement,"" 0  this distinction probably does not influence the
day-to-day treatment of alien detainees. But it has surfaced in some
cases when excludable aliens bring due process challenges to their
confinement conditions. Knauff and Mezei have been interposed
inappropriately in litigation over detention conditions. The sweeping
language in these cases has opened the door for government officials
to argue that excludable aliens in their custody "possess no constitu-
tional rights" to challenge abusive treatment or inhumane detention
conditions.2 1
No court has explicitly adopted this "perverse reading" of the
Constitution. In fact, some judges, in dicta or dissenting opinions,
have used hypothetical examples of severe mistreatment or cruelty to-
ward alien detainees to argue against a broad application of the ple-
nary power doctrine. 2 These arguments find support in the aliens'
held by the hearing board and the Board of Immigration Appeals, based largely on the
testimony of a professional witness who had testified (sometimes falsely) in several notori-
ous loyalty cases during the Cold War. The Board of Immigration Appeals, however, also
made an off-the-record recommendation that Mezei be released from Ellis Island. Four
years after he was ordered excluded, Mezei was paroled into the United States. Except for
an interim parole won after a fleeting victory in the lower courts, Mezei had spent much of
these four years confined in the "Communist ward" on Ellis Island. Weisselberg, Lessons
From Knauff and Mezei, supra note 218, at 970-84.
229. Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903); see supra
note 52.
230. Schmidt, supra note 11, at 321; see supra 122.
231. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1372 (5th Cir. 1987); accord Haitian Ctrs.
Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting government's argument
that Haitians detained on Guantanamo could not claim "any protections under the due
process clause.., even if they had been subjected to physical abuse").
232. As early as 1893, a dissenting opinion in Fong Yue Ting v. United States rejected
the majority's conclusion that Chinese immigrants were not protected by the Due Process
Clause because this analysis "might have sanctioned toward [Chinese] laborers the most
shocking brutality conceivable." 149 U.S. 698, 756 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting). In Jean v.
Nelson, Justice Marshall rejected as "irrational" the notion that an excludable alien "could
not invoke the Constitution to challenge the conditions of his detention." 472 U.S. 846,
874 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also argued Knauff and Mezei must
be read narrowly because some of the Court's language, if taken literally, would seem to
allow the Attorney General to "invoke legitimate immigration goals to justify a decision to
stop feeding all detained aliens." Id.; see also Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
1987) ("the mere fact that one is an excludable alien would not permit a police officer
savagely to beat him"); Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1042 (E.D.N.Y.
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rights tradition, a line of cases granting constitutional protection to
aliens in an ill-defined realm "outside" of immigration law.
B. The Aliens' Rights Tradition: Defining a Border for the Plenary
Power Doctrine
1. Foundation Cases
Like the plenary power doctrine, the aliens' rights tradition grew
out of restrictive legislation against Chinese immigrants in the late
nineteenth century. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, decided in 1886, the
Supreme Court concluded Chinese immigrants could claim equal pro-
tection to challenge the discriminatory enforcement of a municipal or-
dinance regulating laundries. 33  The Court held that "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the
protection of citizens... [its] provisions are universal in their applica-
tion, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to
any differences of race, of color, or of nationality."'  Yick Wo
spawned a line of cases, central to the aliens' rights tradition, protect-
ing aliens from invidious discrimination by state and local officials.23 5
Ten years after Yick Wo, in Wong Wing v. United States,2"6 the
Supreme Court extended constitutional protection to Chinese immi-
grants held in immigration detention, striking down a provision of the
Chinese Exclusion Act requiring detainees to be "imprisoned at hard
labor" for up to one year prior to deportation. 3 7 The Wong Wing
Court reaffirmed in the strongest possible terms that Congress and the
1993) ("[i]f the Due Process Clause does not apply to the detainees at Guantanamo, De-
fendants would have discretion deliberately to starve or beat them, to deprive them of
medical attention").
233. 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
234. ML at 369.
235. Generally, alienage classifications made by state or local governments restricting
aliens' access to government benefits are subject to a heightened level of scrutiny. See
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (invalidating state statute denying welfare ben-
efits to resident aliens). States also cannot bar aliens from ordinary trades and professions
and many civil service jobs. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (invalidating
statutory prohibition against employment of aliens in state competitive civil service); In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (invalidating state statute prohibiting resident aliens from
practicing law). The Court, however, has carved out an exception to these cases, allowing
state and local governments to exclude aliens from governmental positions when the re-
striction primarily serves a "political function." See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432,
445-46 (1982) (upholding state statute barring aliens from employment as probation of-
ficers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (police officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979) (public school teachers); see also Bosniak, supra note 22, at 1110-15 (critiqu-
ing this "political function" exception).
236. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
237. Id at 233.
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executive branch enjoy plenary power to exclude and deport aliens
from the country, without interference from the judiciary.238 The
Court concluded, however, that "imprisonment at hard labor" prior to
deportation moved beyond the realm of immigration regulation and
into the realm of criminal law, where aliens are protected by the Con-
stitution.239 Other cases in the Wong Wing tradition extend Fifth and
Sixth Amendment protection to aliens subject to criminal
proceedings. 240
Yick Wo, Wong Wing, and their progeny suggest the plenary
power doctrine extends only to exercises of the sovereign power to
admit, exclude, or deport aliens from the United States.241 Later deci-
sions support this interpretation.242 These cases stand in stark con-
trast to the shocking denial of constitutional protection in immigration
law. This "aliens' rights" tradition, however, has "never fully coa-
lesced into a coherent and comprehensive body of doctrine... [and
has] never offered a fully textured alternative to the plenary power
238. The Court asserted "[t]he power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the
United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they come to this coun-
try, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive
officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications." Id at 233.
239. The Court explained "even aliens" were protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, and thus "shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." Id. at 238. Thus, the Court concluded the statute before it
"present[ed] a different question" from the challenges to the exclusion and deportation
power raised in the Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Timg. Id. at 233.
240. See United States v. Casimiro-Benitez, 533 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 926 (1976); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1979) (aliens in custodial
interrogation entitled to Miranda warnings). But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259 (1990); infra notes 245-252 and accompanying text.
241. Stated somewhat differently, the plenary power doctrine is confined to the realm
of "immigration law," which is defined as "the body of law governing the admission and
expulsion of aliens." Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 16, at 547 (citing Legomsky,
Immigration Law and Plenary Power, supra note 15, at 256).
242. In Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 492 (1931), for example,
the Supreme Court held aliens present in the United States are entitled to just compensa-
tion under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment when the government confiscates
their property. More recently the Court has stated in dicta that "an alien seeking initial
admission to the United States ... has no constitutional rights regarding his application."
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (emphasis added). This quotation has been
interpreted to mean "it is only in the admissions process that [applicants'] status as exclud-
able aliens limits their Constitutional rights." Singh v. Nelson, 623 F. Supp. 545, 558
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Deborah Levy, supra note 76, at 299 n.9 (stating "the Court in
Plasencia acknowledged the generally accepted wisdom that an alien seeking entry lacks
constitutional rights concerning his application to enter only. Such an appropriately limited
rule leaves open the issue of constitutional rights regarding matters other than the entry
application"); see infra notes 277-283 and accompanying text for a further explanation of
this analysis.
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doctrine."2 43 In fact, the boundary between the plenary power doc-
trine and aliens' rights tradition is not easily marked, and has not al-
ways been respected even when aliens "outside" of immigration law
press constitutional claims.2"
2. Deviations from the Aliens' Rights Tradition
Several notable decisions belie the promise of Yick Wo and Wong
Wing, withholding constitutional protection from aliens even when the
governmental conduct at issue is not an exercise of the federal immi-
gration power. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, for example, the
Supreme Court refused to extend Fourth Amendment protection to a
nonresident alien awaiting criminal prosecution in the United
States.2 45 Verdugo-Urquidez sought to exclude from his criminal trial
evidence obtained when federal officials searched his property in
Mexico without a warrant. But the Court held the Fourth Amend-
ment did not cover such a search, even though it was conducted while
Verdugo-Urquidez was incarcerated in a United States jail. 46
Verdugo-Urquidez relied in part on cases from the aliens' rights
tradition to support his claim for constitutional protection.2 7 The
Supreme Court, however, adopted a very narrow reading of Yick Wo,
Wong Wing, and their progeny, stating "[t]hese cases... establish only
that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections with this country."2A8 The Court concluded that because
Verdugo-Urquidez was "an alien who has had no previous significant
243. Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 16, at 566.
244. Rosberg, supra note 9, at 337. In a recent article focusing on discrimination
against aliens, Linda Bosniak suggests the contrast between the plenary power doctrine
and aliens' rights tradition is not so stark. She argues that distinguishing between cases
falling "inside" and "outside" immigration law "can easily lead to misunderstanding be-
cause it suggests a greater uniformity on both sides of the line than is warranted." Bosniak,
supra note 22, at 1063. I agree with this observation, and in particular with her assessment
that "focusing on the difference between 'inside' and 'outside' [immigration law] tends to
seriously overstate the status of aliens on the so-called 'outside."' Id. Professor Bosniak's
recent analysis comports with my description of a "porous border" between the plenary
power doctrine and the aliens' rights tradition. See infra notes 341-355 and accompanying
text.
245. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
246. Id. at 261-62.
247. Idc at 270-71 (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
248. Id. at 271.
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voluntary connection with the United States," the aliens' rights tradi-
tion "avail[s] him not."249
Verdugo-Urquidez is a significant departure from Wong Wing and
its progeny, which extended constitutional protection to aliens in
criminal proceedings. Indeed, the Court's suggestion that the Consti-
tution protects only persons who have developed "significant volun-
tary connections" to the "national community" reflects a recurring
theme of immigration law. The plenary power doctrine is premised in
part on the notion that Congress must have unfettered power to deter-
mine who will become part of our national community.250 And one of
the principle exceptions to the plenary power doctrine, which grants
procedural due process protection to deportable aliens and lawful per-
manent residents in exclusion proceedings, reflects an understanding
that persons who have developed significant ties to the United States
gain constitutional rights by virtue of their connections to our commu-
nity-251 Thus, both the result and rhetoric of Verdugo-Urquidez
echoed in immigration law, even though the alien claimant was seek-
249. Id. The Verdugo-Urquidez Court employed similar language when analyzing the
text of the Fourth Amendment, asserting that "the people" protected by this provision are
only those "who are part of [our] national community or who have otherwise developed
sufficient connection with this country." 494 U.S. at 265. This analysis was criticized in
Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 984-87 (1991), and Michael
Scaperlanda, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens: To What Extent Do they
Survive United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez?, 56 Mo. L. Ray. 213, 240-42 (1991).
250. In the Chinese Exclusion Case, for example, the Supreme Court stated if Congress
"considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assim-
ilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security... its determination is conclusive
upon the judiciary." 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). This rationale-that the authority to define
our national community must rest with Congress-has caused some to use the "domain of
membership" as shorthand to describe cases applying the plenary power doctrine. See
Bosniak, supra note 22, at 1057.
251. Three dissenting justices in Fong Yue 7ig v. United States suggested because resi-
dent aliens have developed significant ties to the United States, they should be entitled to
some measure of constitutional protection. 149 U.S. 698, 737-38 (Brewer, J., dissenting),
746 (Field, J., dissenting), 762 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (1893). Their views took hold in the
Japanese Immigrant Case, which extended procedural due process protection to aliens in
deportation proceedings. 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903). This analysis reached fruition in Lan-
don v. Plasencia, in which the Supreme Court carved out an exception to Shaugnessy v.
United States ex reL Mezei, allowing a lawful permanent resident who had been "absent
from the country only a few days" to claim procedural due process protection in exclusion
proceedings. 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1952); see supra note 242. Several commentators have ex-
plored the theory that an alien's "membership" or "ties" to the national community limit
the application of the plenary power doctrine. See, e.g., Martin, Due Process and Member-
ship, supra note 212; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties":
A Response to Martin,,44 U. Prrr. L. RFv. 237 (1983) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, "Community
Ties"].
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ing Fourth Amendment protection to exclude evidence from his crimi-
nal trial.252
A similar echo appears in the cases allowing the federal govern-
ment to discriminate against aliens when administering government
benefits. In Flemming v. Nestor, the Supreme Court upheld a provi-
sion of the Social Security Act cutting off benefits to aliens who had
contributed into the Social Security system but were then deported for
past membership in the Communist party.253 The Flemming Court
employed a highly deferential standard of scrutiny, unique to equal
protection analysis, stating that the disabilities imposed on certain de-
ported aliens would be unconstitutional "only if the statute manifests
a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justifica-
tion." 4 The dissenting justices argued the Court should not have
been swayed by the challenged statute's ostensible connection to
"Congress's power to regulate immigration." 255
The Supreme Court reached a similar result in Mathews v. Diaz,
upholding a statute denying Medicare benefits to aliens unless they
had been admitted for permanent residence and had lived in the
United States for at least five years.5 6 The plaintiffs, aliens who were
not eligible for benefits under this provision, argued in the Yick Wo
252. Cf Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, supra note 32, at 1000 (ar-
guing Verdugo-Urquidez marks an expansion of the plenary power doctrine into the crimi-
nal rights arena).
253. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). Ephram Nestor was a lawful permanent resident of 43 years.
He was deported in 1956 because he had been a member of the Communist party from
1933 to 1939. Id. at 605. He had a statutory right to receive Social Security benefits, in an
amount determined by his contributions into the system, until Congress amended the So-
cial Security Act to cut off benefits for those deported for membership in the Communist
party. See id. at 608 (noting "[p]ayments under the Act are based upon the wage earner's
record of earnings").
254. Id. at 611. Stephen Legomsky has argued that the standard applied in Nestor is
more deferential than even the most toothless "rational basis" test, and that the Social
Security Act's classification against aliens would not withstand scrutiny under traditional
equal protection analysis. Stephen H. Legomsky, Suspending the Social Security Benefits
of Deported Aliens: The Insult and the Injury, 13 SursoLKc U. L. REv. 1235, 1248-53 (1979)
[hereinafter Legomsky, Suspending Benefits].
255. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition to rejecting Nes-
tor's equal protection claim, the Court concluded the provision cutting off benefits to cer-
tain deported aliens did not impose "punishment" in violation of the Constitution. The
Court relied in part on the fact that "deportation has been held to be not punishment, but
an exercise of the plenary power of Congress to fix the conditions under which aliens are to
be permitted to enter and remain in this country." Id at 616 (citing Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)). The dissenting justices pointedly noted the ple-
nary power to control immigration was not implicated by Nestor's suit seeking reinstate-
ment of Social Security benefits. Id. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
256. 426 U.S. 67, 69 (1976).
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tradition that the federal government could not discriminate based on
alienage when setting eligibility requirements for welfare programs.
The Mathews Court began its analysis with a resounding endorse-
ment of the aliens' rights tradition, concluding every alien, "even one
whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory,
is entitled to... constitutional protection under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. ' '2s7 But the Court soon shifted to the language
of plenary power, repeatedly stressing that the judiciary must defer to
the political branches "broad power over naturalization and immigra-
tion."'258 Ultimately the plenary power approach prevailed: the Ma-
thews Court concluded that alienage restrictions on federal benefits
were a legitimate part of "the business of the political branches of the
Federal Government... to regulate the conditions of entry and resi-
dence of aliens."2-59
The conflicting language in Mathews has led to discordant inter-
pretations of the opinion. Some commentators focus on the Supreme
Court's initial reaffirmation of the aliens' rights tradition, and empha-
size that Mathews' language can serve as a stepping stone toward
eventual integration of aliens into the constitutional tradition.260
Others stress that the alien plaintiffs lost after the Mathews Court ex-
pressly invoked the plenary power doctrine, and argue that the
Supreme Court improperly transformed a case about eligibility for
government benefits into an issue of immigration regulation.26'
The Mathews decision illustrates just how difficult it can be to
define the boundary that separates the aliens' rights tradition from the
plenary power doctrine.262 In the Yick Wo-Wong Wing line of cases,
257. Id. at 77 (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1893)).
258. Id. at 79-80.
259. Id at 84.
260. A recent commentary by Hiroshi Motomura expresses this view. Professor
Motomura concludes that even though the alien plaintiffs in Mathews did not prevail, "the
contrast with the total judicial deference in the plenary power cases is striking." Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187,35 VA. J. INT'L L.
201, 210 (1995). He suggests the rhetoric in Mathews may be more important than its
result, noting language from the decision provided a "key building block" for later deci-
sions expanding the aliens' rights tradition. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210
(1982)). At the same time, however, the plenary power rhetoric that also pervades the
Mathews opinion has played a key role in recent immigration decisions reaffirming the
plenary power doctrine. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (citing Mathews, 426 U.S. at
80-82 to uphold discriminatory admission criteria against equal protection challenge).
261. See Bosniak, supra note 22, at 1065-67; Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished
Golden Door, supra note 32, at 995-96.
262. Cf Bosniak, supra note 22, at 1066-67 (noting "the line separating 'inside' from
'outside' [immigration law] is not pre-ordained but rather is subject to dispute").
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the Court emphasized that not all claims pressed by aliens are gov-
erned by the plenary power doctrine. But cases like Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, Flemming, and Mathews send a contradictory message.
Several commentators have noted these latter decisions suggest any
federal action against aliens is inextricably linked to the power to con-
trol immigration, and thus must be reviewed with extreme judicial
deference.263
The Supreme Court has not explicitly acknowledged its occa-
sional departures from the aliens' rights tradition. Nor has it provided
consistent guidance on how to determine when aliens are entitled to
protection under the Constitution. Thus, the lower courts have been
saddled with the task of adjudicating the constitutional claims of
aliens on inconsistent precedent, most recently in decisions adjudicat-
ing the due process claims of Haitians and Cubans seeking parole
from immigration detention. These claims have forced courts to con-
sider anew the scope of the Knauff and Mezei decisions. While the
holdings of recent lower court cases continue to deny due process pro-
tection to excludable aliens, their reasoning helps to mark the some-
times elusive boundary between the plenary power doctrine and the
aliens' rights tradition.
C. The 1980s Detention Litigation: Revisiting the Due Process Rights
of Excludable Alien Detainees
As the Cold War subsided, there was little occasion for courts to
reconsider the holdings of Knauff and Mezei. Indeed, soon after
Mezei was decided, summary exclusion fell into disfavor.2 4 The de-
tention of excludable aliens also became rare; the government closed
Ellis Island and began paroling virtually all applicants for entry while
263. See Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation, supra note 22, at 869 ("courts have wrongly
assumed that every federal regulation based on alienage is necessarily sustainable as an
exercise of the immigration power") (emphasis added); Legomsky, Suspending Benefits,
supra note 254, at 1264 ("Whatever merit there might be to the view that immigration
regulation should generate unusual judicial restraint, no reason is readily perceivable for
requiring a similar result with respect to all federal regulation of aliens."); Rosberg, supra
note 9, at 325 ("the government's legitimate interest in flexibility [to fashion immigration
policy] does not require immunity from careful judicial scrutiny for every piece of federal
legislation that has some bearing on aliens or immigration"); see also Scaperlanda, Polish-
ing the Tarnished Golden Door, supra note 32, at 994-1000 (arguing that Mathews and
Verdugo-Urquidez mark an expansion of the plenary power doctrine to cases outside of the
immigration context).
264. Although now codified in statute, the summary exclusion proceedings of Knauff
and Mezei are invoked far less frequently today than in the Cold War era. See INA
§ 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1994); ALErNmioFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POL-
icy, supra note 45, at 402.
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they awaited an administrative hearing.265 The Supreme Court con-
tinued to cite Knauff and Mezei for the general proposition that the
judiciary cannot intercede in immigration decisions,266 and the two
cases spawned a cottage industry of academic criticism. 267 But the
broad assertion that excludable aliens have no due process rights, and
the suggestion they might be detained indefinitely, were seldom at is-
sue for almost three decades.
Beginning in 1980, however, the due process rights of excludable
aliens in detention became a critical concern on two litigation fronts.
Thousands of Haitians seeking asylum were confined under the new
policy, announced in 1981, targeting undocumented excludable aliens
for immigration detention.268 Haitian detainees claimed their incar-
ceration was the result of national origin discrimination, in violation of
the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause.269
In addition, while most of the Cubans arriving in the Mariel boat-
lift of 1980 were paroled into the United States, a small percentage
with criminal records were excluded. When Cuba refused to accept
their return, they were confined by the INS.270 To their ranks were
soon added excludable Marielitos whose initial parole was revoked
when they committed crimes within the United States.271 The INS
265. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F.
Supp. 973, 980 n.18 (S.D. Fla. 1982), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Jean v. Nelson,
711 F.2d 144 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en bane), affd as
modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
266. E.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1981); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 n.6 (1972).
267. See, eg., Aleinikoff, "Community 77es," supra note 251, at 237-39; Henry Hart, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1389-96 (1953); Martin, Due Process and Membership, supra note
212, at 173-80; Schuck, Transformation of Immigration Law, supra note 33, at 20-21.
268. Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 1000.
269. There was in fact significant evidence of discriminatory enforcement of the policy
of detention for undocumented excludable aliens. Government memoranda deliberating
on the new detention policy were captioned "Haitian Program." Jean, 711 F.2d at 1468. A
memorandum sent by the Attorney General to the President acknowledged "[dietention
could create an appearance of 'concentration camps' filled largely by blacks." Louis, 544
F. Supp. at 980 n.19. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion ultimately vacated by
the en banc court, found "ample unrebutted evidence that [the detained Haitians] were
denied equal protection of the laws." Jean, 711 F.2d at 1509.
270. See James LeMoyne, Most Who Left Mariel Sailed to New Life, a Few to Limbo,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1990, at Al; What Happened to the Marielitos?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
1987, at B6 (flow chart summarizing the status of Marielitos, stating 103,000 were released
immediately and 22,000 were initially detained); Paul L. Montgomery, 1774 People Without
a Country: Cuban Refugees Sit in U.S. Jails, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1980, at Al (1774 of those
initially detained were still confined by the INS in December 1980).
271. LeMoyne, supra note 143; Ronald Smothers, Their Crimes Vary, but Most Cubans
Are Serving Sentences of Frustration, N.Y. Thms, Nov. 30, 1987, at B1l.
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continues to confine thousands of Marielitos with criminal records.272
Many face uncertainty as to whether they will ever be released. 3
Like Ignatz Mezei, they have argued the Due Process Clause does not
countenance indefinite detention by executive fiat, even for aliens
who technically have not yet "entered" the United States.
The due process claims of Marielito Cubans and Haitians trig-
gered a fresh examination of Knauff and Mezei. The issues were
starkly presented: Can Marielito Cubans who have committed crimes
be incarcerated indefinitely? Can Haitians who claim invidious dis-
crimination be confined without recourse to the Constitution? Ini-
tially, the Marielito and Haitian detainees met with some success in
litigation seeking parole.27 4 But most appellate courts have since con-
cluded Knauff and Mezei preclude even these poignant due process
claims.275 The linchpin of these decisions is a determination that pa-
role from immigration detention is intimately linked to the admissions
process, and hence to broader immigration policy. As such, most
272. Generally, the INS revokes the parole of Marielitos who have been convicted of
crimes in the United States, issues detainers while they are serving out their criminal sen-
tence, and then takes them into custody at the end of their prison term. Most are then
ordered excluded after a hearing before an immigration judge. The INS reported 2151
Marielitos in custody as of May 1, 1992. Detainers had been placed on another 2300
Marielitos serving prison sentences. FIvE-YEAR DETENTION PLAN, supra note 64, at 18.
Because of a history of riots by Marielito detainees, protesting the resumption of flights
returning them to Cuba, Marielitos are usually confined in Bureau of Prison facilities. Id.
at 19.
273. The prospects for the eventual return of excluded incarcerated Marielitos to Cuba
are "dependent on the uncertainties of diplomacy between two feuding and mutually suspi-
cious nations." ALEINIKOFF ET AL, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND PoLicn, supra note 45, at
447. Cuba has only sporadically agreed to accept the return of some Marielitos. The INS
reviews annually the files of detained Marielitos to determine if they are eligible for super-
vised parole. The current procedures for this review are set out in the Cuban Review Plan,
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 212.12-.13 (1994). This review provides a personal interview for de-
tainees who are not recommended for parole, but does not include procedures for a more
formal adversarial hearing. Id. § 212.12(d)(4)(ii); see generally ALEiNiKoFF ET AL., ImMi-
GRATION PROCESS AND POLICY, supra note 45, at 445-52, 465-73 (detailing litigation and
policy developments for Marielito Cuban detainees); Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d
1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to order release for excluded Marielito Cuban with criminal
record who had been detained since 1985).
274. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 993-97, 1002-04 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (concluding
the INS promulgation of the new policy of detention for undocumented excludable aliens
violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and ordering Haitians released on parole),
affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 144 (11th Cir. 1983),
vacated, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), affd as modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985);
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (concluding the INA
does not authorize the indefinite detention of excludable aliens, and ordering release of
Marielito Cuban who was confined in federal prison).
275. See infra note 284.
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courts have reasoned that the plenary power doctrine must govern
these claims.
Jean v. Nelson, the Haitian class action litigation, provides the
most prominent example of this analysis.276 Initially, a panel of the
Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the Haitian plaintiffs did not claim a
constitutional right to be admitted to the United States. Rather, at
issue was "a right to be considered for parole in a nondiscriminatory
fashion. '2 77 The panel therefore concluded the Haitians' claims did
not relate to the political branches' authority over immigration, and
should be governed by the aliens' rights tradition.278 Finding strong
evidence of "selective and discriminatory enforcement" of the new de-
tention policy, the court determined the Haitian detainees should be
paroled.2 79
Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the panel opinion.
The full court adopted the same framework for analysis: "whether the
grant or denial of parole is an integral part of the admissions pro-
cess."8 0 Unlike the panel, the en banc court concluded the plenary
power doctrine defeated the Haitians' equal protection claim.2' The
court reasoned special deference was warranted because a judicial or-
der to parole excludable alien detainees "would ultimately result in
our losing control over our borders." z As such, the plenary power
doctrine must govern these claims. Applying Mezei, the court held
"the Haitian plaintiffs in this case cannot claim equal protection rights
under the Fifth Amendment, even with regard to challenging the Exec-
utive's exercise of its parole discretion." 3
Jean v. Nelson marked an unfortunate turning point in the contin-
uing litigation over the due process rights of excludable aliens. For
the most part, later cases have adopted the analysis of the Jean en
276. In Jean, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the pressing question of
whether excludable Haitian detainees could raise an equal protection challenge, via the
Due Process Clause, to the allegedly discriminatory denial of their parole applications. 472
U.S. at 849. The Court decided the case by interpreting the governing regulations to pre-
clude national origin discrimination in parole decisions. Id. at 857. The Court therefore
refused to reach the constitutional question on prudential grounds. See id. at 854. Never-
theless, the opinions below remain an influential analysis of the due process rights of ex-
cludable alien detainees. See also supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (background
of Jean).
277. Jean, 711 F.2d at 1484.
278. It. at 1483-1505, 1509.
279. IdM
280. Jean, 727 F.2d at 971.
281. Id. at 975.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
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banc court, and continue to deny due process protection to excludable
alien detainees seeking parole.' 4 These cases have reinvigorated the
Knauff and Mezei decisions in the post-Cold War era. Their impact is
felt most keenly by Marielito criminals whose parole has been re-
voked by the INS. Many have been incarcerated long past the end of
their criminal sentence, and face continued indefinite confinement. 8 5
Nevertheless, while the Jean en banc court applied Knauff and
Mezei to deny due process protection to excludable alien detainees
seeking parole, it also recognized an important limitation to the ple-
nary power doctrine. The court summarized its opinion as a "simple
and straightforward" holding that excludable aliens cannot claim
equal protection to "challenge the decisions of executive officials with
regard to their applications for admission, asylum, or parole."'' 6 At
the same time, the court explicitly recognized "aliens can raise consti-
tutional challenges.., outside the context of entry or admission, when
the plenary authority of the political branches is not implicated."' 7
Thus, because its analysis centered on the Yick Wo-Wong Wing
boundary of the plenary power doctrine, Jean was also a reaffirmation
of the aliens' rights tradition.
D. Lynch v. Cannatella: Due Process Protection to Challenge
Conditions of Confinement
Some cases have recognized that this boundary should protect
even excludable alien detainees from the incursion of the plenary
power doctrine when they seek due process protection to challenge
the conditions of their confinement. In Haitian Centers Council v.
Sale, for example, the court held the conditions of confinement at seg-
regated camps used to confine HIV-positive Haitians violated due
284. See e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995); Gisbert v.
United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1441-43 (5th Cir. 1993); Alvarez-Mendez v.
Stock, 941 F.2d 956, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 127 (1992); Amanullah v.
Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1987); Femandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 (11th
Cir. 1984). For a summary of the "consensus view" that "excludable aliens are outside the
Constitution's mantle, possessing no constitutional rights with respect to their detention,"
see Cruz-Elias v. United States Attorney Gen., 870 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Va. 1994). The
Cruz-Elias case collects both the academic commentary and cases discussing the constitu-
tional rights of excludable aliens detained by the INS. Id at 693-98.
285. See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 21 F.3d 314 (9th Cir. 1994) (granting writ of
habeas corpus for Marielito) (concluding "Itihe practice of administratively imprisoning
persons indefinitely is not a process tolerable in use against any person in any corner of our
country"), vacated, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding continued detention "is
constitutional under Mezei").
286. Jean, 727 F.2d at 984 (emphasis added).
287. Id. at 972.
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process, condemning the "squalid and prison-like" camps and the gov-
ernment's deliberate refusal to provide adequate medical care.28 8 In
dicta, the court rejected the argument that the Haitians confined at
Guantanamo could not claim any protection under the Constitution to
challenge even the most egregious mistreatment by their captors. 8 9
The same analysis was the explicit holding of the Fifth Circuit in
Lynch v. Cannatella.90 The Lynch plaintiffs were stowaways who
claimed they were severely mistreated while in the custody of the New
Orleans harbor police.2 91 The harbor police officers, sued for dam-
ages in their individual capacities, asserted qualified immunity against
these charges.2 2
Government officials claiming qualified immunity must show
"their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or consti-
tutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 293
In Lynch, the stowaways' captors relied on the plenary power doctrine
to establish their qualified immunity defense. 294 They argued that
since Jean v. Nelson and its progeny had stated excludable aliens were
not entitled to due process protection, the stowaways did not have a
"clearly established" constitutional right-or indeed any constitu-
288. 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1042 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (vacated per settlement agreement).
289. Id (stating "[i]f the Due Process Clause does not apply to the detainees at Guanta-
namo, Defendants would have discretion deliberately to starve or beat them, [or] to de-
prive them of medical attention"). Similar dicta appeared in a Second Circuit opinion
earlier in this litigation. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1341-42 (2d. Cir.
1992) (affirming district court's grant of a preliminary injunction in the face of assertions
by government attorneys that the detained Haitians would not be protected by the Due
Process Clause "even if they had been subjected to physical abuse").
290. 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987).
291. Fourteen stowaways were transferred from the barge they had boarded directly
into the custody of the New Orleans harbor police. Two others jumped ship, were re-
trieved by the Coast Guard, and spent two days in INS custody before they were delivered
to the harbor police. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1367. The stowaways claimed during 10 days of
detention they were denied minimal physical comforts such as heat, adequate toilet facili-
ties, and proper bedding; were hosed down with a fire hose when they refused to take cold
showers; and in some cases were beaten by harbor police officers. They further alleged
they were drugged and locked in a steel container lashed insecurely to the deck of a barge
for the return trip to Jamaica, until the barge was intercepted by federal officials. Id. at
1367-68.
292. Id. at 1372, 1374.
293. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added).
294. Surprisingly, the Lynch court never used the term "plenary power doctrine." Nev-
ertheless, the Lynch court framed its analysis as an inquiry into whether the limited consti-
tutional protection afforded to excludable aliens within immigration law also precluded
challenges to their treatment while in custody. 810 F.2d at 1373-74.
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tional right-to be protected from abuse or mistreatment while in
custody.295
In response to this argument, the Fifth Circuit conceded that ex-
cludable aliens' "right to be free from purposeful physical abuse...
has never been explicitly examined by the courts. '296 The court rec-
ognized excludable aliens had limited constitutional rights "with re-
gard to immigration and deportation proceedings," but ultimately
concluded this precedent "does not limit the right of excludable aliens
detained within United States territory to humane treatment."297 The
Lynch court also focused on the underlying justification for the ple-
nary power doctrine: "the overriding concern that the United States,
as a sovereign, maintain its right to self-determination. 2 9 3 The court
emphasized the sovereignty of the United States would not be under-
mined if the stowaways were entitled to challenge the conditions of
their confinement, explaining "we cannot conceive of any national in-
terests that would justify the malicious infliction of cruel treatment on
a person in United States territory simply because that person is an
excludable alien."2 99 Thus, the court held "whatever due process
rights excludable aliens may be denied by virtue of their status, they
are entitled under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to be free of gross physical abuse at the hands of
state or federal officials. '30 0
IV. The Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine
Lynch invoked the boundary of the plenary power doctrine-first
articulated in Yick Wo and Wong Wing and reinvigorated by the Elev-
enth Circuit in Jean v. Nelson-to conclude alien detainees' claims of
295. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1372. The defendants relied on Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d.
1446 (11th Cir. 1986), which held that Marielito Cubans seeking parole could not claim due
process protection, to argue that excludable aliens "have virtually no constitutional rights."
Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1372 (quoting Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1449).
296. Id. at 1372.
297. Id. at 1373 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 969 (11th Cir. 1984 (en banc)).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1374 (emphasis added).
300. Id. (emphasis added). The court then remanded to allow the plaintiffs further op-
portunity to develop their claims. Id. at 1377. The Lynch court accepted the plaintiffs'
allegations as true when reviewing the district court's refusal to grant summary judgment
on the individual defendants' qualified immunity defense. Nevertheless, the court found
some of the allegations in the complaint were "patently inadequate to state a claim of
constitutional dimension." Id. at 1376. On remand, the plaintiffs' attorney failed to com-
ply with instructions to file an amended complaint. The district court then dismissed all
remaining claims with prejudice. Lynch v. Cannatella, 122 F.R.D. 195 (E.D. La.), affd, 860
F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1988).
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mistreatment should be adjudicated under the aliens' rights tradi-
tion.310 Standing alone, Lynch proclaims that regardless of their status
under immigration law, excludable aliens can claim due process pro-
tection to challenge the conditions of their confinement.3°2 But later
301. The Lynch court did not consider an additional argument that is sometimes in-
voked to dilute, or even circumvent, the plenary power doctrine. Some courts and com-
mentators have suggested the plenary power doctrine applies with most force to
congressional action, and should not insulate executive conduct from judicial review. See,
e.g., Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 998 (S.D. Fla. 1982) ("[iut is important to note that
the actions challenged herein are not congressional"). Cf Johnson, supra note 193, at 497
(arguing "the INS' long record of heavy-handed enforcement tactics" should weigh against
employing the usual rules of judicial deference to agency action.); Legomsky, Immigration
Law and Plenary Power, supra note 15, at 255 (leading article considering principle of
plenary congressional power).
But what initially appears to be a fairly simple distinction between congressional and
executive action raises a host of issues, beyond the scope of this article, yet to be fully
explored. The argument that only Congress should be accorded deference in immigration
matters is undermined by leading plenary power cases upholding executive branch action.
See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (when the executive refuses to
waive an exclusion ground "on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the
courts will [not] look behind the exercise of that discretion"). Moreover, it is not always
easy to separate congressional and executive authority. For example, one of the most infa-
mous articulations of the principle of plenary power comes from the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States ex reL Knauffv. Shaughnessy, where the Court concluded "[w]hatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned." 338 U.S. 537,544 (1950) (emphasis added). But Ellen Knauff was challenging
the Attorney General's decision to exclude her without a hearing, a decision made under
regulations promulgated pursuant to a presidential proclamation, which in turn was au-
thorized by a war time statute permitting the President to "impose additional restrictions
and prohibitions on the entry into and departure of persons from the United States" during
an (already declared) national emergency. Only in the loosest sense did the challenged
conduct "flow" from Congress's exercise of the federal immigration power. Id. at 540.
Finally, the executive branch acts in a myriad of ways to enforce our immigration laws, and
proponents of the executive/congressional distinction have not yet sorted out what acts and
which actors should be insulated from plenary power deference. Compare Orantes-Her-
nandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 365 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("[a]lthough the Court recognizes
the great deference owed to Congress and the President in the immigration field, the defer-
ence owed to the INS is more circumscribed") with Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 970 (11th
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (excludable aliens cannot claim equal protection to challenge discre-
tionary parole decisions made by INS officials) and Pena v. Kissenger, 409 F.2d 1182
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stating well-settled rule that denials of visa applications by consular offi-
cials overseas are insulated from judicial review).
My own view is that the source of the challenged action-whether an act of Congress,
a regulation issued by the INS, or a discretionary decision by an official in the field--can
be a relevant factor when deciding whether, and with how much force, plenary power def-
erence should apply. The congressional/executive distinction, however, is sometimes em-
ployed as a rather inexact surrogate for the inquiry that properly occupied center stage in
Lynch: whether the challenged action is an exercise of the power to control immigration.
302. Other commentators have similarly suggested that Lynch is a vindication of the
aliens' rights tradition. See Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 16, at 586 n.215 (plac-
ing Lynch among those cases "in the spirit of" Wong Wing and Yick Wo); ALEINIKOFF Fr
AL., IMMIoRATION PROCESS AND POLICY, supra note 45, at 465 (contrasting Lynch with
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cases, focusing only on Lynch's memorable language, have suggested
that excludable aliens must show "malicious infliction of cruel treat-
ment" or "gross physical abuse" to state a viable due process claim.
A. "Malicious Infliction of Cruel Treatment" or "Gross Physical
Abuse": Betraying the Promise of Lynch v. Cannatella
Medina v. O'Neill marked the first step away from the holding of
Lynch.3"' In Medina, sixteen stowaways in the custody of a private
security firm were detained together twenty-four hours a day in a sin-
gle cell designed to hold six people. After two days of detention, the
aliens attempted to escape. °4 One alien was killed and another
wounded during this attempt when a shotgun being used by a guard to
prod the detainees accidentally discharged. 5
The stowaways sued INS officials, seeking both injunctive relief
and damages.306 The Fifth Circuit reversed a district court ruling in
their favor on several grounds. The court held, contrary to the lower
court's analysis, that the INS did not have a statutory duty to arrange
for the detention of stowaways in appropriate facilities. 0 7 The Fifth
Circuit also concluded the allegations against INS officials were no
more than claims of negligence, insufficient to state a due process
violation.308
cases rejecting excludable aliens' due process claims seeking parole from immigration
detention).
303. 838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'g 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
304. Medina, 589 F. Supp. at 1031 n.7.
305. Medina, 838 F.2d at 801.
306. Medina, 589 F. Supp. at 1034.
307. Medina, 838 F.2d at 802.
308. ld. at 803. The Medina court, following Ortega v. Rowe, 796 F.2d 765, 767-69 (5th
Cir. 1986), held that the district court incorrectly relied upon Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979), the leading Supreme Court decision delineating the analysis to be used when pre-
trial detainees bring due process challenges to the conditions of their confinement. Id.
Under Bell, pretrial detainees are protected from any mistreatment "amount[ing] to pun-
ishment of the detainee." Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. Both Medina and Ortega concluded the
Bell "punishment" standard was significantly undermined by later Supreme Court cases
holding simple negligence did not amount to a due process violation. Medina, 838 F.2d at
803 (concluding "the Supreme Court has shifted ground since Bell"); Ortega, 796 F.2d at
767-69 (asserting the later Supreme Court decisions "render much of Bell's language sur-
plusage"). But Medina and Ortega appear to stand alone in explicitly questioning the con-
tinued vitality of Bell The Fifth Circuit, while currently embroiled in disagreement over
scope of due process protection afforded to pretrial detainees, continues to cite Bell con-
sistently as the controlling precedent for due process conditions claims. See Grawbowski v.
Jackson County Pub. Defenders Office, 47 F.3d 1386, 1395 (5th Cir. 1995), reh'g en banc
granted, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5999 (5th Cir. Mar. 14, 1995); Hare v. City of Corinth, 36
F.3d 412,415 (5th Cir. 1994), reh'g en banc granted, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34475 (5th Cir.
Dec. 8, 1994). Medina and Ortega's rejection of Bell apparently has not spread to other
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In addition, the Medina court invoked Lynch to consider "the
substantive due process rights of excludable aliens. '30 9 After quoting
Lynch's statements that no national interest would justify "malicious
infliction of cruel treatment" and that excludable aliens were surely
entitled to be free from "gross physical abuse," the Medina court con-
cluded: "[t]he stowaways [in this case] alleged neither that cruel treat-
ment was maliciously inflicted upon them nor that they suffered gross
physical abuse. They stated no claim for violation of due process
rights. 310
This brief analysis seems to convert the factual allegations in
Lynch into a threshold standard for all excludable alien detainees,
blurring the distinction between specific allegations of misconduct
found sufficient to defeat qualified immunity and the full scope of due
process protection. The court did not rest its decision solely on this
ground.31' Still, instead of considering Lynch's careful explanation of
the proper scope of the plenary power doctrine, the Medina court sug-
gested "malicious infliction of cruel treatment" or "gross physical
abuse" were prerequisites for excludable aliens to state a due process
violation.
A similar misreading of Lynch appears in Adras v. Nelson, an
Eleventh Circuit decision adjudicating residual claims left unresolved
in the Jean v. Nelson litigation.312 In addition to asserting various
damage claims for alleged unlawful detention,313 the Haitian plaintiffs
in Adras also challenged the conditions of confinement at the Krome
SPC where they were confined in the early 1980s.31 4 The Adras court
readily rejected the bulk of the plaintiffs claims as precluded by the
plenary power doctrine and discretionary function exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act.31 5 The court also concluded INS officials
were protected by qualified immunity, even against the plaintiffs' alle-
cases. See also supra note 172 (critiquing Ortega court's application of the negligence bar
to due process liability).
309. Medina, 838 F.2d at 803.
310. Id. Because the Medina court concluded the plaintiffs' allegations did not state a
due process violation, it found it unnecessary to consider the defendants' qualified immu-
nity argument. 1l at 802.
311. See supra notes 307-308.
312. 917 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1990).
313. The damage claims for unlawful detention were primarily asserted under the Fed-
eral Torts Claims Act ("FTCA"). See id. at 1555. The plaintiffs also sought damages under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Id at 1557.
314. Krome was severely overcrowded, with numerous attendant conditions problems,
during this time period. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
315. Adras, 917 F.2d at 1556-59. The court relied on Jean v. Nelson to conclude the
detention of the Haitian plaintiffs was not unlawful, and also held that the defendants were
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gations of unconstitutional conditions of confinement.316 The Adras
court found no conflict between its ruling and Lynch's refusal to grant
qualified immunity because "[t]here is no allegation [by the Adras
plaintiffs] of 'gross physical abuse' and malicious infliction of harm by
INS agents." '317
Adras appears to be unique in its grant of qualified immunity to
government officials in the face of a complaint stating the plaintiffs
suffered "severe overcrowding, insufficient nourishment, inadequate
medical treatment and other conditions of ill-treatment arising from
inadequate facilities and care. ' 318 The Fifth Circuit, rejecting a quali-
fied immunity defense asserted by local jail officials who failed to pro-
vide reasonable medical treatment to a pretrial detainee, has
pointedly noted that "[a] constitutional right to minimally adequate
care and treatment is not a novel proposition. ' 31 9 Yet the Adras court
granted qualified immunity even for claims of severe overcrowding
and inadequate medical care because the court "f[ou]nd no complaint
here approaching the 'gross' physical abuse outlined in Lynch. '320
Thus Adras, like Medina, extracted language from Lynch to set
an unusually high threshold for excludable aliens seeking to challenge
the conditions of their confinement. It appears that the Lynch court
selected the phrases "malicious infliction of cruel treatment" and
"gross physical abuse" to emphasize the audacity of the argument that
shielded from liability under the "discretionary function" exception of the FTCA. See id
at 1557.
The Adras plaintiffs apparently also pursued the challenge to the conditions of their
confinement as an FrCA claim. Id. at 1559. The FTCA seldom provides an adequate
remedy for federal detainees challenging conditions of confinement. Detainees in federal
custody can recover damages under the FrCA only for claims (such as negligence in pro-
viding medical care) stating a cause of action recognized under state tort law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1994). The FTCA does not provide relief for all deprivations of constitutional
rights. See Muniz v. United States, 374 U.S. 150 (1962); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980). Also, because the FTCA reaches only the negligence of "employee[s] of the Gov-
ernment," and does not impose liability on any "contractor with the United States," fed-
eral detainees held in local jails or contract facilities cannot bring FTCA claims to
challenge their treatment in these facilities. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2761 (1994); Logue
v. United States, 412 U.S. 521 (1972).
316. Adras, 917 F.2d at 1557-59.
317. IMt at 1559 (quoting Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th Cir. 1987)).
318. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint).
319. Colle v. Brazos, 981 F.2d 237,246 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Thompson v. City of Los
Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1448 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing summary judgment in favor of the
defendant county jail on claim that the failure to provide pretrial detainee with bed or
mattress violated due process); Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28,31 (1st Cir. 1988) (due process
claim may be stated when detainee was confined with a cellmate for 22-23 hours per day
and forced to sleep on a floor mattress).
320. Adras, 917 F.2d at 1559.
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excludable alien detainees do not have a "clearly established" consti-
tutional right to be free from such serious mistreatment. 321 In con-
trast, Medina and Adras suggest excludable aliens seeking to
challenge the conditions of their confinement must allege abuse of at
least this severity to state a viable due process claim.32
The Medina and Adras courts did not seem to be conscious of this
marked shift from Lynch's original analysis. Instead, the "malicious
infliction of cruel treatment" or "gross physical abuse" standard
evolved silently, largely within the context of adjudicating individual
defendants' assertions of qualified immunity.323 As such, it might be
seen as a by-product of the many limitations on damage claims against
governmental entities and government officials, which would not im-
pact claims for injunctive relief. 24
There are hints, however, that "malicious infliction of cruel treat-
ment" or "gross physical abuse" may take root in a broader array of
cases as a prerequisite for excludable aliens to establish a constitu-
tional violation. Indeed, dicta in later opinions suggests that this inter-
pretation has already overtaken the Lynch court's original analysis. In
Gisbert v. United States Attorney General, for example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected an argument by Marielito Cuban detainees that Lynch
supported their claim of substantive due process protection to chal-
lenge their indefinite confinement. The court cautioned its holding in
Lynch should be read very narrowly, explaining that Lynch created a
"gross physical abuse exception" to the general principle that excluda-
321. See Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1374. The court was incredulous the defendants would
claim qualified immunity in the face of allegations that they had denied the stowaways
proper shelter and access to toilets, and had hosed them down with fire hoses, slamming
the detainees against their cell walls. Id. at 1367. The court noted, for example, "[i]f the
arguments advanced by the harbor police defendants were sound, the Constitution would
not have protected the stowaways from torture or summary execution." Id. at 1375.
322. Medina v. O'Neill, 838 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir. 1988); Adras, 917 F.2d at 1559-60.
323. In Lynch, Medina, and Adras, the plaintiffs sought both injunctive relief and dam-
ages from government officials sued in their individual capacities. The Medina court did
not reach the qualified immunity issue, concluding that because the plaintiffs had "alleged
neither that cruel treatment was inflicted upon them nor that they suffered gross physical
abuse" they had failed to state a due process claim. 838 F.2d at 803. In Lynch and Adras,
however, the phrases "malicious infliction of cruel treatment" and "gross physical abuse"
played a critical (albeit dramatically different) role in the courts' qualified immunity analy-
sis. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1374; Adras, 917 F.2d at 1559-60.
324. Qualified immunity is but one of a host of doctrines that limit the damage liability
of governments and their employees. See generally PETER H. ScHtrcK, SUING GOVEmRN-
MEN-r CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 203-07 (1983) (summarizing various
"complex and to some degree unsettled" liability and immunity doctrines).
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ble aliens have no due process rights in immigration proceedings .3 25
Similarly, the Second Circuit, citing Lynch, has asserted that excluda-
ble aliens enjoy "little or no" due process protection "[o]ther than
protection against gross physical abuse." 326 And a federal district
court has read Lynch, as "narrow[ed]" by Gisbert, to hold that "an
alien's substantive due process right to humane treatment while in
INS detention is limited to the right to be free from 'gross physical
abuse.'
,327
Thus it appears the central lesson of Lynch-that excludable
aliens can claim full due process protection to challenge their treat-
ment while in custody-may be supplanted by a requirement that they
must allege deliberate cruelty or severe physical abuse to overcome a
qualified immunity defense, or even to state a viable claim. This re-
quirement has not been imposed on pretrial detainees.328 The "mali-
cious infliction of cruel treatment" and "gross physical abuse" of
Medina and Adras is also notable for its departure from the analysis
used by the Supreme Court to adjudicate the conditions claims of con-
victed prisoners.
B. A Comparison to Eighth Amendment Standards
Pretrial detainees, and others in civil confinement, ought to enjoy
due process protection against inhumane detention conditions "at
least as great as the Eighth Amendment protection available to a con-
victed prisoner. ' 329 Medina and Adras, however, do not provide this
325. 988 F.2d 1437, 1442 (5th Cir.), amended on other grounds, 997 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.
1993).
326. Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1171 n.5 (2d Cir. 1990). Correa has been
cited in later decisions reiterating the "other than protection against gross physical abuse"
language. See Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1349 (2d Cir. 1992) (Maho-
ney, J., dissenting) (rejecting grant of due process protection to excludable aliens); Mejia-
Ruiz v. INS, 871 F. Supp. 159, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
327. Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1550 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (emphasis added).
328. See supra note 319. A search of computer databases reveals that Lynch, Medina,
Adras, and the later cases explicitly citing to these decisions are the only federal court cases
containing either the phrase "malicious infliction of cruel treatment" or "gross physical
abuse." The only exception is Swenson v. Stidham, where the Supreme Court used the
phrase "gross physical abuse" when describing a criminal defendant's claim he had been
coerced by police to confess to a crime. 409 U.S. 224, 225 (1972).
329. City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (citing Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)). Pretrial detainees are protected against any condi-
tion or practice that amounts to "punishment," while incarcerated criminals must show
"cruel or unusual punishment" to establish that the conditions of their confinement violate
the Constitution. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16. Thus, conditions constituting "cruel and unu-
sual" punishment under the Eighth Amendment a fortiori should also amount to a due
process violation. Hare v. City of Corinth, 36 F.2d 412, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1994), reh'g en
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heightened protection to excludable alien detainees. To the contrary,
the "malicious infliction of cruel treatment" or "gross physical abuse"
standard echoes requirements that the Supreme Court has rejected as
too stringent even for convicted prisoners challenging detention con-
ditions under the Eighth Amendment.
In Wilson v. Seiter, for example, the Supreme Court held prison-
ers must prove a "culpable state of mind" on the part of prison offi-
cials in order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.330 This
subjective component of the Eighth Amendment must be satisfied
even when prisoners allege widespread, systemic problems with condi-
tions of confinement. Yet the Wilson Court concluded that prisoners
challenging overall detention conditions do not have to prove govern-
ment officials acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm," thus rejecting a standard that mirrors the "malicious
infliction of cruel treatment" language in Medina and Adras.331 The
Wilson Court explicitly stated this "very high state of mind... does
not apply to prison conditions cases. 332 Instead, "deliberate indiffer-
ence"-a term meaning "something less than acts or omissions for the
very purpose of causing harm"-is the appropriate subjective stan-
dard for most conditions claims.333
The Eighth Amendment also has an objective component. In
Hudson v. McMillian, the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's
attempt to transform this component into a standard requiring a
threshold showing of a "significant injury" to state an Eighth Amend-
ment claim.334 Instead, the Court reiterated that the objective compo-
nent of the Eighth Amendment is a contextual standard drawing its
meaning from "the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
banc granted, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34475 (5th Cir. 1994); Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142,
1146 (7th Cir. 1984). But see 1 MusHi, supra note 123, § 3.01, at 132 (arguing "[i]t is
doubtful whether there is a practical difference between the application of these two
standards").
330. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
331. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.
1973), cited in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). The Court had previously
adopted this heightened subjective standard for emergency situations involving prison dis-
turbances. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.
332. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03.
333. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03.
334. 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). In Hudson, an inmate who had been beaten by prison guards
suffered bruises and swelling on his face, mouth, and lip. The blows also loosened the
prisoner's teeth and cracked his dental plate. The Fifth Circuit concluded the guards' use
of force was "clearly excessive and occasioned unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"
but held the prisoner could not prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim because he had
suffered only "minor" injuries. Ik at 4-5.
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gress of a maturing society. ' 335 The Hudson Court concluded that
"[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause
harm, contemporary standards of decency are always violated ...
whether or not significant injury is evident. 336
The Medina and Adras courts' emphasis on "gross" physical
abuse seems inconsistent with Hudson's holding that the use of exces-
sive force raises a colorable Eighth Amendment claim, even when it
does not cause a particularly serious or lasting physical injury. More-
over, other Supreme Court cases make clear that many types of
harm-including inadequate medical care,337 serious overcrowding, 338
and even prolonged exposure to unreasonably high levels of environ-
mental tobacco smoke3 9-can constitute "cruel and unusual punish-
ment." Yet dicta in the immigration detention context suggests "an
alien's substantive due process right to humane treatment while in
INS detention is limited to the right to be free from 'gross physical
abuse.'"1° This standard would leave alien detainees without protec-
tion from many types of inhumane treatment that are prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment.
C. The Silent Influence of the Plenary Power Doctrine
It appears, therefore, that excludable aliens challenging the con-
ditions of their confinement have been cut off from the usual frame-
work for analyzing conditions claims under the Constitution. The
Supreme Court has held that neither malicious treatment for the very
purpose of causing harm nor physical abuse resulting in significant in-
jury are necessary to show "cruel and unusual punishment" under the
Eighth Amendment. But the conditions claims of excludable aliens
have on occasion been dismissed outright or rejected on qualified im-
munity grounds for failing to allege "malicious infliction of cruel treat-
ment" or "gross physical abuse." This standard has developed in
335. ld. at 8-9 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
336. Id. at 9.
337. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
338. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 356 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing numerous lower court rulings where overcrowding was held unconstitutional).
339. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2481 (1993).
340. Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1550 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (quoting Lynch v. Can-
natella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th Cir. 1987), as explained in Gisbert v. United States Attor-
ney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1442 (5th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis added); see also Correa v.
Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1171 n.5 (dicta suggesting excludable aliens enjoy "little or no"
due process protection "[o]ther than protection against gross physical abuse").
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isolation; it has been imposed only upon excludable alien detainees.a41
And it is all the more unusual since it has been applied to due process
claims, where civil detainees are supposed to receive greater constitu-
tional protection than the Eighth Amendment affords convicted pris-
oners. In short, excludable aliens seeking to challenge the conditions
of their confinement have at times been granted significantly less than
a full measure of due process rights.
Under the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Jean v. Nelson, however,
conditions claims should fall beyond the reach of the plenary power
doctrine. Indeed, Lynch v. Cannatella-the source of the "malicious
infliction of cruel treatment" or "gross physical abuse" language-rec-
ognized that.Jean "does not limit the right of excludable aliens de-
tained within United States territory to humane treatment."'342
Medina and Adras misconstrued the holding in Lynch, and instead al-
lowed plenary power analysis to infect their adjudication of conditions
claims. In this respect, they resemble United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, Flemming v. Nestor, and Mathews v. Diaz-cases where the
Supreme Court applied plenary power deference reflexively to any
constitutional challenge pressed by aliens, even when their claims
were not linked to the federal government's power to control
immigration.343
What is striking about Lynch and its progeny, however, is the un-
conscious evolution of the "malicious infliction of cruel treatment" or
"gross physical abuse" standard. Verdugo-Urquidez, Mathews, and to
a lesser extent Flemming all reflect a deliberate choice between the
plenary power doctrine and the aliens' rights tradition.344 In contrast,
341. See supra notes 319, 328.
342. 810 F.2d at 1373.
343. See supra notes 245-263 and accompanying text.
344. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the alien respondent's
arguments from Yick Wo-Wong Wing line of cases in the aliens' rights tradition, concluding
"[r]espondent is an alien who has had no previous significant voluntary connection with
the United States, so these cases avail him not." 494 U.S. at 271; see supra notes 245-252
and accompanying text. In Mathews v. Diaz, the Court at first invoked the language of the
aliens' rights tradition but ultimately was swayed by the plenary power argument that Con-
gress's denial of Medicaid benefits to aliens was an exercise of its "broad power over natu-
ralization and immigration." 426 U.S. at 77, 79-80; see supra notes 256-262 and
accompanying text. The competition between the plenary power doctrine and the aliens'
right tradition was less overt in Hemming v. Nestor, where the alien plaintiffs' "most insis-
tently pressed constitutional objections" centered on whether the termination of Social
Security benefits constituted legislative "punishment" without judicial trial. 363 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1960). Still, the Court relied in part on plenary power cases stating deportation is
not "punishment" under the Constitution, a move that was challenged by the dissenting
justices who argued "the Court cannot rest [its] decision.., on Congress' power to regu-
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the Medina court simply seized on language in Lynch and incorrectly
assumed that protection from "malicious infliction of cruel treatment"
or "gross physical abuse" was all that the Constitution provided ex-
cludable aliens. Similarly, the Adras court overlooked the distinction
between the Haitian plaintiffs' claims of unlawful detention, which
under Jean should be governed by the plenary power doctrine, and
their challenges to the conditions of confinement. Instead, the court
allowed the plenary power doctrine to pervade its entire opinion.
These analytical errors have since spread, at least in dicta, to other
cases.35 In short order, Lynch's careful analysis, which was protective
of the due process rights of excludable alien detainees outside of the
immigration context, has silently evolved into a standard limiting their
due process rights even to challenge the conditions of their
confinement.
This silent spread of the plenary power doctrine might be seen as
the mirror image of a similarly subtle flow of constitutional values into
the immigration law realm. Hiroshi Motomura has convincingly ar-
gued that "phantom constitutional norms" sometimes spill across the
boundary isolating immigration law from the rest of public law, and
thus contribute to the gradual erosion of the plenary power doc-
trine.346 These "phantom norms," which are derived from the aliens'
rights tradition, influence the interpretation of immigration statutes,
"produc[ing] results that are much more sympathetic to aliens" than a
plenary power analysis would suggest.3 7 In essence, Professor
Motomura argues that the process of statutory interpretation can
serve as a vehicle to smuggle constitutional protection for aliens into
the immigration law realm. He and others suggest only a crumbling
and soon-to-be defunct barrier separates aliens from full integration
into "the people" protected by the Constitution.34
But this focus on an eroding plenary power doctrine, which until
recently has dominated immigration law scholarship, overlooks the
polluting effect of the plenary power doctrine outside the immigration
late immigration." Id at 616; id. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 255; see
also Legomsky, Suspending Benefits, supra note 254, at 1264.
345. See supra notes 325-327 and accompanying text.
346. Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 16, at 547-50, 564-75.
347. Id. at 564.
348. Id. at 549 (citing a "widely accepted view... that the doctrine is in some state of
decline"); Schuck, supra note 33, at 90. Stephen Legomsky's essay for this symposium
issue, which argues the current trend seems to point toward the emergence of a "restricted
plenary power doctrine-a new 'PPD-lite,"' is in a similar vein. Legomsky, Ten More
Years, supra note 33, at 936-37.
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law realm.349 The traditional analysis of the relationship between the
plenary power doctrine and the aliens' rights tradition depicts only a
one-way flow of constitutional norms into the immigration law realm.
In fact, the border is porous in both directions. The cases adjudicating
the conditions claims of excludable alien detainees illustrate a second
silent migration: the influence of the plenary power doctrine also
spills out beyond the boundary of immigration law.
V. Conclusion: Policing the Porous Border
To stop this leaching, courts must police the porous border be-
tween the plenary power doctrine and the aliens' rights tradition.
Such vigilance, however, may come with a price: it can reinforce the
barrier separating aliens from the Constitution whenever they press
immigration law claims. A strong boundary between the plenary
power doctrine and the aliens' rights tradition may, in some cases, be
used to defeat aliens' constitutional claims.
Jean v. Nelson illustrates this point. The Eleventh Circuit framed
its analysis of the due process rights of Haitian detainees seeking pa-
role as a choice between the plenary power doctrine and the aliens'
rights tradition. The court distilled a standard for making this choice:
"whether the grant or denial of parole is an integral part of the admis-
sions process. '35 ° Jean clarified the scope of the plenary power doc-
trine and the aliens' rights tradition, but ultimately concluded
excludable aliens seeking parole could not claim due process
protection.
While many have criticized this result, Jean at least asked the cor-
rect question: whether granting aliens constitutional protection will
impinge on the political branches' authority to control immigration.35 1
This same analysis enabled the Lynch court to decide what others had
349. Cf. Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, supra note 32, at 994-1000;
Bosniak, supra note 22, at 1059-68.
350. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 971 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacating 711 F.2d 1455
(11th Cir. 1983).
351. Jean's ruling that excludable Haitian detainees seeking parole cannot claim equal
protection rights under the Fifth Amendment, even in the face of strong evidence of na-
tional origin discrimination, is not the inevitable result of this analysis. The panel opinion,
vacated by the en banc court, applied the same test but concluded that the Haitian plain-
tiffs' claim of "a right to be considered for parole in a nondiscriminatory fashion" did not
implicate the political branches plenary power over immigration, and thus should be gov-
erned by the aliens' rights tradition. 711 F.2d at 1484. The panel went on to find "ample
unrebutted evidence that the plaintiffs were denied equal protection." Ide at 1509; see
supra notes 276-287 and accompanying text (discussing the Jean panel and en banc
opinions).
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only suggested in dicta: despite the sweeping language of Knauff and
Mezei, the plenary power doctrine does not reach the due process con-
ditions claims of alien detainees.
The different results in Jean and Lynch show that the porous bor-
der between the plenary power doctrine and aliens' rights tradition
lies in neutral territory. Insisting that courts respect this boundary
does not automatically advantage either of the two competing tradi-
tions. The outcome depends on whether the challenged governmental
conduct is inextricably linked to an exercise of the immigration power.
But emphasizing the border between the plenary power doctrine
and the aliens' rights tradition does cause a subtle shift in analysis. A
common pattern in immigration cases is to consider first whether alien
claimants "deserve" constitutional protection-based on whether they
have "entered" the country or have developed significant ties to the
United States. 52 When courts make an explicit choice between the
plenary power doctrine and the aliens' rights tradition, however, the
focus shifts to the nature of the governmental power at issue. Courts
are then deciding whether there is a reason to stand back and allow
the government especially wide latitude to treat aliens differently
under the Constitution. I believe that if courts routinely considered
the constitutional claims of aliens from this perspective, instead of re-
flexively (or unconsciously) invoking plenary power precedent, it
could weaken the plenary power doctrine.
Nevertheless, some might argue that fortifying the border be-
tween the plenary power doctrine and the aliens' rights tradition will
only impede the flow of constitutional values into the immigration law
realm. It hardly seems advantageous to aliens to reinforce the very
barrier isolating them "in the backwaters of constitutional jurispru-
dence. ' 353 But even as norms derived from the aliens' rights tradition
occasionally seep into the realm of immigration law, I suspect that
there is at least as much spillover in the opposite direction. Medina
and Adras illustrate the unsettling stealth and ease with which the ple-
nary power doctrine can overshadow the aliens' rights tradition.
Moreover, the plenary power doctrine is the stronger of these
competing traditions, more firmly entrenched in the body of law gov-
erning the constitutional rights of aliens. Despite a wealth of aca-
demic criticism and litigation aimed at reform, the plenary power
doctrine remains the central tenet of immigration law. The aliens'
352. See supra notes 242, 251.
353. Aleinikoff, Membership and the Constitution, supra note 35, at 9.
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rights tradition has not developed into a doctrine of equal stature.3 54 I
conclude that so long as the plenary power doctrine "smothers the
entire field of immigration law, '355 courts must be vigilant in policing
its porous border. Otherwise, the "perverse readings of the Constitu-
tion" that mark immigration law will continue to seep out to infect
claims-like the conditions claims of alien detainees-where aliens
should be granted full constitutional protection.
354. See Bosniak, supra note 22, at 1004 (noting "wholly apart from questions of admis-
sion, expulsion, and naturalization, the law continues to treat alienage as the rightful basis
for less favorable treatment of persons in a variety of contexts, notwithstanding the Yick
Wo tradition").
355. Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 16, at 574.
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